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ABSTRACT 
Tax practitioners in South Africa have been operating in an umegulated tax industry. This has 
allowed certain tax practitioners to fail in their duties to their clients, as many do not have to 
abide by any code of conduct or ethical principles, to the detriment of the public. Other than the 
provisions in the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, there has been no regulation. As a result of losses 
suffered by taxpayers either through the incompetence, ignorance or negligence of a tax 
practitioner, as substantiated by case law, and increased costs borne by the South African 
Revenue Services due to unnecessary queries and tax disputes, the Minister of Finance, Trevor 
Manuel, introduced the concept of tax industry regulation in his Budget Speech in 2002. This 
resulted in the introduction of section 67 A into the Income Tax Act, providing for a registration 
process for tax practitioners. All practising tax practitioners were required to register with the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services by 30 June 2005. In addition, a 
discussion paper was issued in 2002 setting out the proposal of the Revenue Services to regulate 
the tax industry through the fonnation of an Association of Tax Practitioners. This proposal 
includes various contentious issues and casts significant doubt on whether the proposed model is 
the most suitable. The goal of the research was therefore to evaluate the current status of tax 
advisory services in order to demonstrate the need for regulation and to compare the proposed 
SARS model with two established regulatory authorities: the Estate Agency Affairs Board and 
the Australian Tax Agents Board. A conceptual model for regulation was developed in order to 
test all the models against a simple regulatory framework to detennine whether each was aligned 
to certain best practices proposed in this framework. The research methodology was qualitative 
in nature, involving the critical interpretation of docwnentary data and data generated during a 
public discussion forum of tax practitioners. It was concluded that the SARS proposal is too 
prescriptive and, at the same time, too broad in its scope. In order to address the key objective, 
identified as protection of the taxpaying public, a simplified regulation procedure was 
recommended, which would adhere to the proposed regulatory framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT, GOALS AND RESEARCH 
METHODS 
Introduction and background 
The proposed regulation of tax practitioners in South Africa was first introduced by 
Trevor Manuel in his budget speech in 2002, in which he indicated "that the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS) would initiate discussions on the appropriate 
regulation of tax consultants and advisors in South Africa in order to promote compliance 
and ensure that taxpayers receive advice consistent with tax legislation" (SARS, 
2005a:1). This subsequently resulted in an amendment to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
(the Act), by the introduction of section 67 A into the Act, through the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act, 2004, promulgated on 24 January 2005. Section 67A (1) of the Act 
reads as follows: 
Every natural person who (a) provides advice to any other person with respect to 
the application of the Act administered by the Commissioner; or (b) completes or 
assists in completing any document to be submitted to the Commissioner by any 
other person in terms of such Act, must register with the Commissioner as a tax 
practitioner in such form as the Commissioner may determine . . . 
This registration of tax practitioners is the first step to be taken in the ultimate regulation 
of the tax industry. Once SARS has collected this data they have "indicated that their 
intention is to establish a tax board that will regulate tax practitioners and legislation 
effecting this regulation will be introduced at a later state, possibly late in 2005" (Smith, 
2005:1). Regulation of the tax industry in South Africa could have many benefits and 
should aim to achieve these. One benefit is that regulation might be able to assist SARS 
in the policing of compliance and prevent the overburdening of the tax courts with 
unnecessary tax disputes, thereby increasing efficiency and saving money for all parties. 
In addition it could help to protect taxpayers by ensuring that responsible, ethical and 
correct tax advice is provided on tax matters and to protect ethical tax practitioners from 
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unqualified tax practitioners who previously may have deprived them of work or 
damaged the reputation of tax practitioners in general through unscrupulous tax advice. 
SARS issued a discussion paper in 2002 setting out its proposal relating to how the tax 
industry should be regulated. The foundation of this proposal was that a "regulated 
professional monopoly for tax practices, similar to the professional monopoly that 
auditors and lawyers enjoy in many countries" (Du Plessis, 2003:9) be established. It 
was proposed that an Association of Tax Practitioners (the Association) be formed that 
would have "its own legal persona and would be run by the stakeholders themselves. 
SARS would be an important stakeholder but would not be the regulator" (SARS, 
2002b: 14). The discussion paper went on to state how the Board governing the 
Association would be represented and operated, what the objectives of the Board would 
be, of particular relevance being that the Board is "to co-operate at all times with SARS 
and the National Treasury" (SARS, 2002b: 14), the various categories of membership 
within the Association and qualifications or experience necessary to become a member. 
This proposal contained various contentious issues and caused many areas of concern for 
both taxpayers and tax practitioners relating to the possible impact of this regulation. It 
lacked key elements in certain areas. For example, m an article by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2005:6-7) the writer referred to the fact that "nowhere in the 
literature thus far provided by SARS on the proposed regulation of tax practitioners is it 
expressly stated that one of the objectives is to subject tax practitioners to sanctions if 
they advise or assist their clients in relation to tax avoidance schemes". The concern was 
expressed that SARS would possibly include additional objectives once the registration 
process had been completed and then later disclose additional requirements attached to 
regulation. These various issues therefore cast significant doubt on whether the proposed 
SARS model is in fact the most suitable model for South Africa. A comment made by 
Izel Du Plessis (2003 :9) is that "an important function of the regulation of tax 
practitioners is to strike an appropriate balance between loyalty to the tax system and the 
client ... it also has several other objectives, such as protecting clients from unscrupulous 
or incompetent tax practitioners". She further stated that the "current proposal tends to 
over-compensate for past wrongs and leans towards being too severe, which may in itself 
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render the proposal non-executable in practice". With the possibility of the current 
proposal being non-executable it is therefore necessary to consider alternative models and 
evaluate their effectiveness in achieving the regulation of the tax profession in South 
Africa. The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) took the 
initiative in conducting regional visits with members to discuss various aspects of the 
proposed regulation in order to put forward recommendations to SARS on how to amend 
the proposed model to better fit South Africa and to achieve the desired outcomes. 
SAICA used the Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB) as the regulatory model as a basis 
for comparison with the model that SARS has envisaged. In the Proposed Regulation of 
Tax Practitioners Discussion Document issued by SAICA (2005:1) it clarified the 
purpose of the EAAB in that: 
The EAAB states that its role is neither to protect the regulated industry nor to 
protect the consumers at all cost. Instead, its role is to protect the public interest 
by assuring every individual's right to justice and equal treatment whether that 
individual is a consumer or estate agent practitioner. 
In terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act, 112 of 1976, the objects of the board are to 
"(a) maintain and promote the standard of conduct of estate agents, and (b) regulate the 
activities of estate agents". 
A further model on which SAICA based its discussions was that of the Tax Agent's 
Board in Australia. This Board is more functional than that of the EAAB and sets out 
general responsibilities of tax agents, their qualification requirements, certain 
disqualifications and punishments for offences. It is responsible for determining "the 
suitability of applicants to be registered as tax agents, dealing with complaints about tax 
agents and ensuring that proper standards are maintained across the tax agent profession" 
(Australian Tax Agent's Board: 2005). 
In addition, besides the evaluation of the SARS proposal against the abovementioned two 
existing authorities, the researcher considered it to be necessary to establish a framework 
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for the regulation of the tax industry, against which the various regulatory models could 
be evaluated. This would help to determine if the proposals are in compliance with the 
best practices suggested by the framework and assist in the identification of gaps or 
weaknesses contained in each proposal. This will aid in demonstrating the most 
appropriate model on which to base tax regulation in South Africa, with the possibility of 
the SARS model being non-executable in practice as mentioned above. 
The problem, however, remams that after three years of discussions there is still no 
certainty as to what the regulation will ultimately entail and how the regulating body will 
be operated and governed. In addition, tax practitioners have no clarity as to who would 
be entitled to solicit for tax advisory services and once registered as a tax practitioner up 
to what level advice could be provided. This gives rise to serious concerns for chartered 
accountants, lawyers and members of other accounting institutes. In addition it is 
uncertain what protection the new legislation would provide to the taxpayer to ensure that 
he or she would now be getting a professional service different from what was provided 
before. It was emphasised in a SAICA tax update seminar conducted in 2005 that over 
the years many taxpayers had fallen victim to poor tax advice. This is further 
corroborated by Professor George Goldswain in his research thesis entitled "Remission of 
Penalties in Income Tax Matters", in which he made reference to a number of tax cases 
where the taxpayer had suffered as a direct result of poor or negligent advice on behalf of 
the advisor. One such case referred to in the thesis (2003:108 and 109) is that of CIR vs 
BP Miller 1 where: 
the taxpayer, a pharmacist, appointed a certain firm of accountants on the advice 
of his bankers to oversee his business accounts and to attend to his income tax 
returns. He testified that he gave his accountants all the information they 
required. However, when he was investigated, he realised that the correct figures 
had not been disclosed in this tax returns. The Special Court determined the 
penalty with reference to the fact that the taxpayer at all times relied on his 
accountants and made all documentary evidence and bank statements available to 
156 SATC 1 
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them. The Cape Provincial Division confirmed the Special Court's decision, 
which was to remit the penalty imposed by the Commissioner from approximately 
R250 000 (a 100% penalty or 50% remission) to approximately R125 000 (a 50% 
penalty or 75% remission). 
Ongoing allegations of abuse by tax practitioners appear to emphasise the need for 
regulation. On the other hand, there may be advantages as well as disadvantages for 
taxpayers in an unregulated profession. 
It is therefore the uncertainty and the flaws in the current SARS proposal that led to this 
research on the regulation of the tax industry. The research evaluates the proposed model 
of regulation, explores alternative models that could be implemented and compares the 
alternative models and that of SARS against a simple regulatory framework. The 
research attempts to highlight the most appropriate model that would seek to be to the 
benefit of both the taxpayer and tax practitioner in South Africa and achieve desired 
outcomes such as the protection of taxpayers, assisting SARS with regard to compliance 
and the protection of ethical tax practitioners from the unscrupulous, amongst others. 
Goals of the research 
The goals of the research were: 
1. to evaluate the current situation of an unregulated tax profession in South Africa, 
in order to demonstrate the need for regulation to offer protection to all the 
interested parties in the system; 
2. to develop a basic regulatory framework against which the other regulatory 
models could be evaluated; 
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3. to analyse the proposed SARS model for regulation and to compare it with the 
EAAB model and the regulation methods used by the Australian Tax Agents' 
Board; 
4. to test all the models being evaluated against the desired outcome of "achieving 
balance : a balance between abuse and monopoly, a balance between market 
forces and legislation and a balance between the interests of SARS, taxpayers and 
tax practitioners" (Du Plessis, 2003:9) through the use of the simple regulatory 
framework; and 
5. to recommend the most appropriate model for the regulation of tax practitioners in 
South Africa. 
Research methods, procedures and techniques 
The research methodology was qualitative in nature, involving the critical interpretation 
of documentary data and data generated at a discussion forum of tax practitioners. 
The data and the methods used to collect and generate the data were as follows: 
• documentary records, principally 
the Discussion Paper issued by SARS on the regulation of tax practitioners; 
the Estate Agency Affairs Act, 112 of 1976; 
documents relating to the regulation of tax practitioners in Australia; 
the codes of conduct of professional bodies in South Africa, including 
SAICA and the legal profession amongst others; and 
the Income Tax Act. 
• a synopsis of the views of presenters and participants at a discussion forum on the 
regulation of tax practitioners, held in the Eastern Cape with tax practitioners and 
SAICA. 
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The data was subjected to an in-depth analysis in order to identify common and 
contrasting themes and relationships between themes with which to inform the process 
of identifYing a model most appropriate to address the issues revealed by the analysis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the issues at hand relating to the regulation of 
tax practitioners, a synopsis of the research topic and problems surrounding the area of 
research. It provided background information as to why this area of research was chosen, 
what the goals of the research were and the methods and procedures utilised to conduct 
the research. The next chapter explores in further detail the background to the regulation 
process by investigating the current status of the tax profession, identifying why the need 
for regulation arose and the steps taken thus far in the regulation process. 
Each of the chapters that follow discuss the various components of the research process: 
• evaluating the SARS regulation model against a basic regulatory framework 
developed by the researcher for this purpose; 
• evaluating the Estate Agency Affairs Board model and comparing it with the 
SARS model; 
• evaluating the Australian Tax Agents Board model and comparing it with the 
SARS model; 
• comparing all three models with the conceptual regulatory framework; and 
• making recommendations for a regulation model that will meet the needs of the 
South African taxpaying public and address the concerns expressed by persons 
and bodies in writing and in a discussion forum. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE CURRENT STATUS OF TAX ADVISORY SERVICES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FIRST STEPS TO REGULATION 
Introdnction 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the need for the regulation of the tax industry was 
announced by Trevor Manuel in his budget speech of 2002 where he indicated that 
regulation of the tax industry was necessary in order to "promote compliance and ensure 
that taxpayers receive advice consistent with tax legislation" (SARS, 2005a: I). His 
announcement therefore created the impression that problems were being experienced 
with the current system and that taxpayers were not, in all instances, receiving advice 
consistent with tax legislation. This chapter aims to explore the current tax advisory 
system and to identify why the need arose for the regulation of the tax industry. 
The current tax advisory system 
Historically South Africa has followed an unstructured approach to the regulation of tax 
services and "many tax practitioners have abused this situation" (Du Plessis, 2003 :4). A 
large number of tax practitioners are not required to be registered with a professional 
organisation such as SAICA or the South African Law Society and therefore do not have 
to abide by any code of conduct or ethical principles. A further significant problem 
according to SARS (2002b:2) is that "no minimum standard in respect of qualifications 
or experience is required for tax practitioners" to operate and provide advice. Tax 
practitioners range from those who are qualified chartered accountants, advocates and 
lawyers to those who might have a bachelor of commerce degree, a diploma or simply a 
matriculation certificate. Due to the fact that anyone in South Africa is allowed to 
provide tax advice and practise as a tax practitioner, taxpayers have little protection from 
those unprofessional advisors who provide advice and once payment is received, 
disappear before SARS can start investigating and making enquiries. The fact that not 
every tax practitioner has a degree does not make those without a degree incompetent, as 
many may have been practising in the tax arena for years and have more practical 
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experience than those with a degree. It is, however, the few unscrupulous tax advisors 
who are abusing the system that would require regulation to be instituted in order to offer 
better protection to the taxpayers and uphold the good name of tax professionals. If there 
are errors in a tax return either through deliberate misstatements or negligence, this has 
consequences for both SARS and the taxpayer. "From SARS's perspective this means a 
great deal of time and energy is spent unnecessarily and inefficiently in correcting errors 
made or addressing the unprofessional conduct of a small but significant number of tax 
practitioners" (SARS, 2002b:2). This results in the wastage of money collected from the 
general body of taxpayers, which could be applied more effectively by the State. 
Secondly, "from a taxpayer's perspective the unprofessional conduct of a tax practitioner 
may place either his or her funds and good reputation at risk" (SARS, 2002b:2). In most 
cases a taxpayer would seek tax advice from a 'professional' in order to arrange his or her 
tax affairs in such a manner so that he or she would be able to avoid tax legally. This 
desire to pay less tax is what unscrupulous tax advisers could take advantage of. The 
technical quality of advice provided in order to ease the taxpayer's burden and thus save 
money is not normally questioned by the taxpayer as the 'professional' is deemed to have 
the requisite knowledge. If this advice, however, proves to be incorrect, it is the taxpayer 
in most instances who will face the wrath of SARS, as the taxpayer is ultimately 
responsible for the information in his or her tax return. As soon as the taxpayer is found 
by SARS to be providing incorrect information, he or she could be labeled by SARS as 
unethical and placed under its 'watchful eye'. SARS (2002b:2) further states that "the 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants has noted that it has received 'many 
complaints' from members of the public for poor performance or other problems 
encountered with accountants related to people not registered with SAICA". The 
consequences of an unregulated tax industry was emphasised in a SAICA tax update 
seminar conducted in 2005 (SAICA, 2005:79), where "war stories" of unregulated tax 
advisors were related. The presenter made anecdotal reference to cases of blatant theft of 
tax payments, to grossly negligent preparation of tax returns and to giving advice "that 
would have failed a first year tax student". In addition, case law has accumulated over 
the years recording evidence of instances where a taxpayer has suffered either through 
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the incompetence, ignorance or negligence of a tax practitioner. Goldswain (2003), in his 
thesis entitled "Remission of Penalties in Income Tax Matters" made reference to a 
number of these cases. One such case documented in the research Goldswain (2003: 102 
and 103) is CfR vs Da Costa2 where: 
the taxpayer, an immigrant of humble origin, entrusted Iris tax affairs to a firm of 
accountants that used a "short cut" method to determine his income. As a result, 
there was an under-declaration of income. Although conceding that the taxpayer 
had no intention to deceive, the Commissioner submitted that the taxpayer should 
be penalised for the deceit of Iris agents. 
The Special Court found that the deceit of the accountants should be imputed to 
the taxpayer, but found at the same time that the reliance by the taxpayer on the 
accountant was an "extenuating circumstance" and substantially remitted the 
100% penalty imposed by the Commissioner. 
The Appellate Division was not convinced that the deceit of the accountant should 
be attributed to the taxpayer in the circumstances, but found that it was not 
necessary to decide the point, because the penalty imposed by the Special Court 
was reasonable. The Special Court had imposed a penalty of R3 000 in the place 
of the 100% penalty of approximately R16 000 imposed by the Commissioner. 
In a further special court case, fTC 15403, the taxpayer's defense was that the non-
disclosure of certain revenue was as a result of the "dishonesty and incompetence of his 
previous accountant" (Goldswain, 2003: I 08). The penalty in this case was reduced by 15 
percent, but in this instance the "incompetence of the previous accountant was not 
specifically mentioned as one of the circumstances that contributed towards the remission 
of the penalty" (Goldswain, 2003:108). 
' 47 SATC 87 
J 54 SATC 400 
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Due to the fact that the final responsibility for the tax return legally rests with the 
taxpayer, as the tax consultant bears limited responsibility, in the types of cases 
mentioned above the taxpayer carries the burden of defense against an attack by SARS 
and tries to recover what he or she can from the advisor. It was further emphasised in the 
SAICA tax update seminar (SAICA, 2005:79) that over the years many taxpayers have 
fallen victim to poor tax advice, which makes it difficult for another professional 
consultant to effect "damage control" and to try and plead with the SARS officials to "go 
easy" on the taxpayer who in good faith had accepted the advice provided by the 
unscrupulous tax advisor. In the United States case of Estate Sprull v Commissioner 4 the 
court had the following to say: 
When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as 
whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice. 
Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an 
accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek 
a "second opinion", would nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a 
presumed expert in the first place ... 
Taxpayers, in good faith, rely on the expertise of the professional and are not expected to 
question the advice provided. This approach, however, cannot be followed in an 
unregulated environment as there is no distinction between the competency and ethics of 
various people providing advice. Those looking simply to make money could take 
advantage of the lack of regulation and the good faith of taxpayers. 
Current measures providing recourse for taxpayers 
Although South Africa does not regulate tax practitioners in the sense of a code of 
conduct or a qualification requirement, certain provisions contained in tax legislation may 
be applied in respect of tax practitioners acting on behalf of the taxpayer. For example, 
section 73 of the Act deals with the duty of a person who prepares accounts on behalf of 
4 88 TC 1197 (1987). 
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another person in support of a tax return and the requirements to be complied with by 
this individual. Section 73 reads as follows: 
(1) If any person submits in support of any return furnished by him under this Act 
any balance sheet, statement of assets and liabilities or account prepared by any 
other person, he shall, if the Commissioner so requires, submit a certificate or 
statement by such other person recording the extent of the examination by such 
other person of the books of account and of the documents from which the books 
of account were written up, and recording in so far as may be ascertained by such 
examination, whether or not the entries in such books and documents disclose the 
true nature of any transaction, receipt, accrual, payment or debit. 
(2) Any person who has prepared any balance sheet, statement of assets and liabilities 
or account for any other person shall, at the request of such other person, furnish 
him with the certificate or statement required under subsection (I). 
This section therefore offers some protection to the taxpayer in that the individual 
preparing the supporting documentation takes responsibility for this documentation and 
provides a statement confirming this to the Commissioner. Should the taxpayer suffer a 
loss as a direct result of relying on such evidence, the Commissioner may consider that 
extenuating circumstances exist and accordingly reduce the penalty to be imposed. 
In addition to the above section, the annual income tax return submitted by all taxpayers 
itself contains a section where it requires the person who prepared the return or 
supporting schedules on the taxpayer's behalf to sign the return and complete a 
declaration. 
Section 75 of the Act sets out the penalty that will be imposed if any of the following 
occur: 
(a) any person who neglects to furnish, file or submit any return or document as 
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and when required by or under this Act; or 
(aA) any person who fails to register as a taxpayer or to inform the Commissioner 
of any change in address as contemplated in section 67; ... 
(d) fails to show in any return prepared or rendered by him on behalf of any 
other person any portion of the gross income received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such other person or fails to disclose to the Commissioner when 
preparing or making such return, any facts which, if so disclosed, might 
result in increased taxation; ... 
(g) submits or furnishes a false certificate or statement under section seventy-
three; ... 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding 24 months. 
In addition to the above sections, where a tax practitioner is a member of a profession, a 
complaint can be lodged with the professional institution for investigation and possible 
disciplinary action may result. If the taxpayer is a victim of unsolicited tax advice "the 
South African Revenue Services (SARS) or a taxpayer may report unprofessional 
conduct of that practitioner to the profession to which he or she belongs. Unfortunately, 
however, existing codes of professional conduct are not normally tax specific and 
professional bodies may encounter difficulties when prosecuting misconduct with 
specific reference to tax" (SARS, 2002b:2). Section 10SA(2) of the Act currently 
provides some recourse for a taxpayer receiving advice from a professional. Section 
IOSA(2) of the Act reads as follows: 
Where any person who carries on any profession, calling or occupation in respect 
of which a controlling bodys has been established has, in relation to the affairs of 
any taxpayer, done or omitted to do anything which in the opinion of the 
Commissioner -
(a) was intended to enable or assist such taxpayer to avoid or 
unduly postpone the performance of any duty or obligation 
5 Any professional association, body or board that has been established. 
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(b) 
imposed on such taxpayer by or under this Act, or by 
reason of negligence on the part of such person resulted in 
the avoidance or undue postponement of the performance 
of such duty or obligation; and 
constitutes a contravention of any rule or code of conduct 
laid down by the controlling body which may result in 
disciplinary action being taken against such person by that 
body, 
the Commissioner may lodge a complaint with the said controlling body. 
Section I OSA( 4) of the Act provides further that "the complaint shall be considered by 
the controlling body to which it is made and may be dealt with by it in such manner as 
the controlling body in terms of its rules sees fit". For example, if a taxpayer received 
advice from a chartered accountant which was incorrect, the taxpayer would have the 
right to lodge a complaint with the Commissioner who would in tum inform SAICA. In 
terms of section 10S(A) (4) SAICA would deal with the complaint in such manner as it 
would see fit. The problem, however, remains that most controlling bodies have a code 
of conduct which in itself prohibits members from unlawfully soliciting tax advice and 
provides recourse to clients of its members should any suffering occur. In most 
instances, however, "complainants are not always aware of the code of professional 
conduct binding a member of a particular profession. Without this knowledge 
complainants are not in a position to evaluate whether a tax practitioner's conduct is in 
breach of the particular code of professional conduct that might bind him/her" (SARS, 
2002b:2). For example, there is specific reference made to tax practice in the code of 
conduct that is required to be upheld by chartered accountants. Section 6 of the SAICA 
code of professional conduct (2002:20-23) dealing with tax practice encompasses the 
following onerous requirements: 
1. A tax consultant should put forward the best position in favour of a client, 
provided he/she does so: 
1.1 with professional competence, integrity and obj ectivity, 
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1.2 within the bounds ofthe law. 
Doubt may be resolved in favour of the client/employer if there is reasonable 
support for the position. 
2. A member (etcetera) should ensure that the client/employer understands that: 
2.1 tax services and advice offered may be challenged where they are 
based on opinion rather than fact, as is often the case, 
2.2 responsibility for the content of the tax return rests with the 
client/employer even where the return has been prepared by the 
member. 
3. Material matters relating to tax advice/opinions given to client/employer, 
should be recorded in writing. 
4. A member should not be associated with any return or communication which 
is suspected to: 
4.1 contain false or misleading statements, 
4.2 contain statements or information furnished recklessly with regard as 
to their truth or falsity, 
4.3 omit or obscure information in such a way as to mislead the revenue 
authorities. 
5. A member may use estimates in the preparation of tax returns, if: 
5.1 exact data cannot be obtained, 
5.2 such estimates are generally acceptable, 
5.3 it is made clear in the returns that they are estimates and not exact 
figures, 
5.4 he or she is satisfied as to the reasonableness of the estimate. 
6. In preparing a tax return, a member may rely on information furnished by the 
client/employer, provided: 
6.1 the information appears reasonable; 
6.2 the member makes use of the client/employer's returns for prior years 
where feasible; 
6.3 The member makes reasonable enquiries when information appears 
incorrect or incomplete. 
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Members are, however encouraged [not required] to: 
• request the supply of supporting data, 
• make reference to relevant books and records of the business 
operations. 
7. Where a member learns of a material error or omission relating to tax returns 
of prior years, the client/employer should be advised promptly, to disclose this 
to the Receiver, 
7.1 The member may not personally inform the Receiver without the 
permission to do so from the client/employer. 
8. Where such an error is not corrected, the member should: 
8.1 decline to perform further services related to the erroneous 
information, 
8.2 consider resigning from the relevant client/employer, and 
8.3 follow the process recommended in (2.3) above relating to the 
resolution of ethical conflicts. 
9. Where the member continues to act for the client/employer, he/she should 
attempt to ensure that the error is not repeated in subsequent tax returns. 
If any of the above requirements are not upheld by a tax practitioner bound by this code, 
the taxpayer has a right to lodge a complaint with the professional body. The 
professional body would then seek suitable disciplinary action. The problem, however, 
remains that where a tax practitioner does not belong to a profession then he or she can 
solicit any type of tax advisory work that he or she wishes and the only recourse available 
to the taxpayer in this instance is civil action for damages if loss is suffered. Where the 
tax advisor is a "man of straw", this would provide no protection against such a loss. The 
Commissioner will therefore not be able to apply the provisions as set out in section 
105A( 4) of the Act, to these tax practitioners and it is this group of unregulated tax 
practitioners that would represent a more serious concern for taxpayers. 
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The first step to regulation 
As highlighted in the preceding paragraphs the current tax advisory system has little or no 
regulation and offers limited protection for taxpayers. The factors identified above and 
the fact that South Africa requires a well-functioning tax system in order to be fully 
effective, brought about the need for regulation of the tax industry. The first step taken 
after the announcement of the regulation by Trevor Manuel in his budget speech of 2002 
was a subsequent amendment to the Act, by the introduction of section 67 A, through the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2004 promulgated on 24 January 2005. Section 67A (I) 
of the Act reads as follows: 
Every natural person who (a) provides advice to any other person with respect to 
the application of the Act administered by the Commissioner; or (b) completes or 
assists in completing any document to be submitted to the Commissioner by any 
other person in terms of such Act, must register with the Commissioner as a tax 
practitioner in such form as the Commissioner may determine ... 
In terms of this section all existing tax consultants and advisors were required to be 
registered with SARS by the 30 June 2005. Persons providing tax advice for the first time 
are required to register within 30 days of doing so. Section 67 A(2), subsequently 
amended by the Revenue Laws Second Amendment Bill (2005) released on 7 November 
2005, also provides details of individuals who are not required to register, namely a 
person who: 
a) provides advice or completes or assists in completing any document, as 
contemplated in subsection (1), solely for no consideration to that person or 
his or her employer or a connected person in relation to that employer or that 
person; 
b) provides advice contemplated in subsection (I) solely in anticipation of or in 
the course of any litigation to which the Commissioner is a party or where the 
Commissioner is a complainant; 
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c) provides advice contemplated in subsection (1) solely as a incidental or 
subordinate part of providing goods or other services to another person; 
d) provides advice or completes or assists in completing any document, as 
contemplated in subsection (1) solely-
1. to or in respect of the employer by whom that person is employed on 
a full-time basis or to or in respect of that employer and connected 
persons in relation to that employer; or 
11. under the direct supervision of any person who is registered as a tax 
practitioner in terms of subsection (1); or 
e) provides advice solely with respect to the application of the Customs and 
Excise Act, 1964 (Act No. 91 of 1964), or completes or assists in completing 
any documents for purposes of that Act. 
Section 67 A therefore defines a tax practitioner by specifying the functions of such a 
person: providing advice in relation to any taxation act and completing or assisting to 
complete any document to be submitted to the Commissioner. It is noteworthy that only 
natural persons are required to register and this raises questions relating to the status of 
incorporated bodies providing tax services. 
In order to assist with the registration process, SARS developed a registration form called 
a TP-l in 2005 for the specific purpose of registering as a tax practitioner or changing 
registered particulars. The information required to be completed on this form are: the 
personal particulars of the tax practitioner, the income tax reference number and the date 
of commencement of completion of tax returns or the provision of advice to the public. 
In the case of a tax practitioner trading under a business vehicle, for example a close 
corporation or trust, the details of the business vehicle is required together with the 
income tax and pay-as-you-earn (PA YE) numbers. The third section of the form requires 
that the tax practitioner indicate what his or her qualifications are and the highest level 
obtained at a tertiary institution. Further details requiring completion are particulars of 
membership with professional bodies including the membership number, the number of 
clients of the tax practitioner and an indication of the nature of work done. The section 
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regarding the nature of work is split into four categories: return preparation and 
completion, planning, opinions and dispute resolution. This is then further split into 
various tax categories: individuals, provisional tax, trusts, P AYE, customs and estate 
duty, for example. In addition, the taxpayer is required to indicate his or her major focus 
area being either return preparation and completion, planning, opinions or dispute 
resolution and finally a declaration concerning the trueness and correctness of 
information supplied in the TP-I form is required to be completed and signed by the tax 
practitioner. On completion, the tax practitioner can then either submit the form manually 
or electronically. On receipt SARS will confmn the registration and provide a 
registration number for the practitioner. This number is to then be utilised on all 
correspondence with SARS. 
A concern raised by a member during the SAICA discussion forum held in 2005 was the 
uncertainty of what SARS would do with the information once a tax practitioner had 
registered, specifically with regard to secrecy and the use of information for alternate 
purposes, for example for SARS to select a sample of tax practitioners and audit these. 
SARS however, has indicated that the purpose of the registration process is to enable 
SARS to collect data on the number of existing tax practitioners and details of their 
qualifications, experience, number of clients, nature of work performed and whether they 
belong to an existing professional body. This would help SARS in identifying the type of 
tax practitioner presently providing tax services in South Africa and assist SARS to make 
better informed decisions regarding the system that would ultimately be used for the 
regulation of tax practitioners. According to SARS (2005c: I) "no provision is made in 
the legislation for the refusal of registration of a person who is providing advice in 
respect of tax matters or who is completing or assisting with the completion of tax 
documents ... A person's educational qualifications, experience, type of tax advice or 
services provided or the volume of services provided, does not affect registration". In 
order to ensure that all the necessary information is provided, a penalty for non-
registration was introduced and should a tax practitioner not register he or she may face a 
[me or imprisonment for up to twenty-four months. Once SARS has collected this data 
they have then "indicated that their intention is to establish a tax board that will regulate 
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tax practitioners and legislation effecting this regulation will be introduced at a later 
stage, possibly late in 2005" (Smith, 2005: 1). Registration therefore only confirms that a 
tax practitioner is a "registered tax practitioner with SARS as required by law. It is not 
an indication of ... competency, level of skills or experience acquired. Hence registration 
or a registration number may not be used for advertising purposes, to attract, obtain or 
retain clients" (SARS, 2005d: 1). 
Conclusion 
As discussed in the paragraphs above the regulation of the tax industry could help to 
enforce a well-functioning tax system in South Africa. In order to be effective tax 
practitioners will be relied upon heavily as "they playa critical role in assisting the 
taxpayer to fulfill their complicated tax obligations and often act as intermediaries 
between taxpayers and tax authorities" (Du Plessis,2003:9). Du Plessis (2003:9) further 
states that it is "an important function of the regulation to strike an appropriate balance 
between loyalty to the tax system and the client". A proposed model on the regulation of 
the tax industry in South Africa was distributed by SARS in 2002 for comment. This 
proposed model is evaluated in the following chapter in order to determine if it will have 
the desired effect and will effectively address the concerns of the taxpayers and the tax 
practitioners in the country. 
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CHAPTER 3 - EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SARS MODEL OF 
REGULATION 
Introduction 
As highlighted in the preceding chapter the need for regulation of the tax industry has 
arisen due to perceived abuse of the current system by tax practitioners and in order to 
achieve a well-functioning tax system within South Africa, amongst other factors. 
Regulation of the industry has many objectives, "such as protecting clients from 
unscrupulous or incompetent tax practitioners, increasing administrative efficiency and 
improving the integrity of the tax system" (Du Plessis, 2003:9). In the opinion of the 
writer of this thesis, regulation will assist SARS in policing compliance and protecting 
the tax base and will assist to protect the ethical tax practitioners from unqualified tax 
practitioners who currently deprive them of work and damage their reputation. In 
addition it could prevent the overburdening of the tax courts with unnecessary tax 
disputes, thus increasing efficiency and saving money for all parties. The regulation of 
tax practitioners should also be supported due to the fact that currently "a large number of 
tax practitioners are not required to be registered with a professional organisation that has 
professional conduct rules in place as well as disciplinary steps that can be taken against 
defaulting members" (Dijkman, 2003:1). 
This chapter proposes a simple regulatory framework against which various regulation 
models can be evaluated. The proposed SARS model for regulation is also discussed. 
A framework for regulation 
The degree to which any industry is regulated lies on a continuum, the extreme points of 
which are no regulation and full state control. A regulated industry may rely purely on 
self-regulation which, in its tum, may be voluntary or legislatively imposed. The 
philosophy underlying the need for regulation is an important consideration: a state which 
favours strong central control will impose the strongest form of regulation, whilst a state 
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favouring economic freedom will impose no regulation at all, but would rely on market 
forces. As taxation revenue constitutes the major source of state revenue in South Africa, 
the need to protect the tax base would appear to suggest that there would be a tendency 
towards a stronger form of regulation. 
In broad terms, and from the point of view of SARS (refer to Trevor Manuel's 2002 
budget speech where the need for regulation was stated as follows: to "promote 
compliance and ensure that taxpayers receive advice consistent with tax legislation"), the 
objectives of regulating tax practitioners would appear to be: 
• the protection of the tax base; and 
• the protection of the taxpaying pUblic. 
These would be appropriate regulatory objectives for tax practitioners as well, with the 
second objective assuming primary importance. In the case of SARS, the first objective 
would be more important. 
In a report commissioned by the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation (a 
Ministerial Advisory Board which was created by an Act of Parliament in 1993), 
Falkena, H. et al (2000:2) stated the view of the Task Team which drew up the report that 
"the regulating authorities and the regulated parties both have an interest in the creation 
and maintenance of an effective and efficient system of regulation ... ". This opinion was 
expressed in relation to regulation of the financial sector, but applies equally to the tax 
system. An effective regulatory system will be one which achieves the objectives of 
regulation and an efficient system will be cost-effective, in other words, the benefits will 
exceed the costs. The costs of regulation would comprise the costs of compliance and the 
costs of non-compliance. Measuring the costs of regulation would not be too difficult, 
comprising costs relating to the regulation system itself, which would be passed on to the 
tax clients, as well as the legislative penalties imposed for infringing the regulatory 
requirements. Measuring the benefits would be far more challenging. The benefits are 
largely a saving in costs: a saving on penalties for tax infringements which taxpayers 
22 
would not have to pay when they are provided with good tax advice and a resulting 
increase in revenue to the Fiscus, as well as a saving in related costs, including the costs 
of discovering, investigating and prosecuting tax defaulters. 
Falkena, H. et al (2000) express the opinion that the process of regulation involves both 
the provision of guidance and the imposition of constraints through the following actions: 
• establishing the rules of behaviour; 
• monitoring compliance with the rules; 
• a supervisory process; and 
• enforcement of the rules in the case of non-compliance. 
In the view of the writer, in addition to these specifically regulatory actions, a regulatory 
framework for taxation should make provision for: 
• an ethical code and rules of ethical conduct; 
• measures to enhance the level of awareness of the taxpaying public in relation to 
its rights and duties; and 
• measures to ensure an appropriate level of expertise of tax practitioners. 
The parameters of a sound regulatory system as discussed above have been set out in a 
diagrammatic form below. 
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REGULATION OF TAX PRACTITIONERS 
OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION 
• Protection ofthe tax base 
• Protection of the taxpaying public 
/ ~ 
PROTECTING THE TAX BASE PROTECTING THE TAXPAYING 
PUBLIC 
• Legislation 
• Legislation: regulation of tax 
- penalties for evasion practitioners (separate legislation 
- measures against tax avoidance or within the Income Tax Act) 
GOALS 
Specific goals must be set to address the broad 
objectives. 
REGULATION PROCESS 
• Provision of guidance 
• Imposition of constraints 
I 
TAX ADVISOR 
REGULATION FRAMEWORK 
Ethics 
Expertise • Establish rules of behaviour 
• • Monitor 
1 • Supervise 
• Enforce REGULATION BODY 
l t 
TAXPAYER PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Awareness • Effectiveness: achieving objectives 
Education • Efficiency: cost-effectiveness 
0 cost-benefit principle 
0 compliance costs 
0 non-compliance costs 
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This framework is used in chapter 6 to evaluate the various regulation models discussed 
in the research. 
Spectrum of regulation 
As has been stated, there is a spectrum of possible levels on which the tax advisory 
industry could be regulated, the first being where little or no regulation is enforced. This 
is the area into which most countries in the world fall . According to Du Plessis (2003:9) 
it "involves an essentially unregulated tax profession that co-exists with regulated 
professions such as accountancy and law". "Market forces are the only mechanism to 
ensure tax practitioner competence, in that taxpayers wishing to obtain sound tax advice 
will normally engage a professional person specialising in tax" (SARS, 2002b:4). 
Examples of such countries falling within this category are the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. These two countries have a specific tax profession, whereby members are 
required to demonstrate competency by way of examination or dissertation before being 
allowed to use the designation of the professional body. Relying on market forces alone 
requires a willing, informed buyer and a willing seller, who engage in arm's length 
transactions. The nature of the market in tax advice is inherently skewed because the 
buyer (the taxpayer), though willing, may be uninformed and have no basis on which to 
judge the quality of the service he or she is buying. Advice which may appear to have a 
high value to the taxpayer in the sense of achieving tax savings, may involve him or her 
in severe penalties at a later stage, therefore being very poor advisory service. To rely 
purely on market forces would appear to be insufficient to guarantee that taxpayers 
receive the correct advice from suitably qualified advisors. 
The second level on the spectrum of regulation is where "there is some flexibility over 
categories of practitioner and their qualification requirements" (SARS, 2002b:4), such as 
in the United States of America. This form of regulation has the effect of restricting 
certain activities to "licenced practitioners and members of other regulated professions, 
and involves a well-developed regulatory framework" (Du Plessis, 2003 :9). A fully 
regulated system, such as that in Australia, China and Germany, "establishes a regulated 
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professional monopoly for tax practices" (Du Plessis 2003 :9) and in most cases this body 
is often an independent government body separate from the tax administration. 
SARS issued a discussion paper in 2002 setting out its proposal as to how the tax industry 
in South Africa should be regulated. Many institutions, such as SAICA, have supported 
the regulation process and have provided comments on the SARS proposal as the creation 
of a formalised tax industry has been viewed as a positive step. Thus far the legal 
profession has decided to stay outside of the process, as it is of the view that it takes 
responsibility for its own members and would discipline accordingly. It is the SARS 
proposal and its objectives that are evaluated in the following paragraphs in order to 
determine whether this proposal will be the best system to implement in South Africa or 
whether a better alternative may exist. 
The Association of Tax Practitioners 
The SARS model proposed that an Association of Tax Practitioners (the Association) be 
formed in South Africa. It described the Association as being independent from SARS 
and self-regulated. According to SARS (2002b: 14) "this Association would have its own 
legal persona and would be ruu by the stakeholders themselves". Being independent 
from SARS would enhance the credibility of the Association in that taxpayers would not 
associate it with SARS, acting as its agents, but would recognise the independence of tax 
advisors and would be encouraged to make use of the tax practitioners forming part of 
this Association. In addition, SARS would have a direct link to the body of tax 
practitioners and the role of the tax practitioner acting as an intermediary between SARS 
and the taxpayer, would be enhanced. Dijkman J H (2003:2), a legal and ethical director 
of SAICA, expressed concern "that the establishment of a separate regulatory body for 
tax practitioners would be a duplication of effort" as it was felt by SAICA that the 
maj ority of tax practitioners were already members of other professional bodies. A 
further submission made by Arendse J (2005:3) referred to the fact that SAICA was of 
the view that the Association should recognise that its members are already regulated in 
terms its existing regulatory structures. SAICA further states that "it is essential that a 
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'level playing field' is maintained. However, within the regulatory framework, 
recognition should be given to those professional associations that already have a well-
established Code of Conduct and properly functioning disciplinary procedures" (Arendse, 
2005:3). SAICA is of the opinion that, as its members are already regulated, it would not 
be necessary for their members to be regulated in terms of this Association. In a recent 
submission to SARS, however, SAICA has indicated that they "accept that all tax 
practitioners need to be subject to the same standard of regulation and, therefore, we 
reluctantly accept the need to ensure that SAICA's regulation of its members is equal to 
the requirements imposed on all other tax practitioners, although we believe them to very 
stringent at present" (Arendse, 2005:4). 
One alternative would be for the Association to grant exemptions to professionals already 
regulated by their own professional bodies, provided the levels of regulation are at least 
as stringent as the level of the Association. Another option would be to create a class of 
affiliated membership for such professionals. Both alternatives will provide a saving in 
costs which, in any event, would be passed on to the taxpaying public by way of the fees 
for professional advice. 
Objects of the Association 
The discussion document issued by SARS contains, inter alias, fifteen objects governing 
the Association, each having its own pros and cons. The most onerous of these are 
discussed below: 
(a) To promote common interests and insist upon a high standard of professional 
behaviour. 
The first object governing the Association, according to SARS (2002b: 16) is: 
to promote the common interests of tax practitioners throughout the Republic of 
South Africa by means other than the carrying on by the Association of any 
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trading or other profit-making activities, or the participation by the Association in 
any business, profession or occupation carried on by any of its members, or the 
provision to any of its members of financial assistance or of any premises or 
continuous services or facilities required by its members for the purpose of 
carrying on any business, profession or occupation. 
This underlines the independency principle of the Association. In other words members 
must be seen to be independent and must in fact be independent from the stakeholders, 
SARS and the National Treasury, of the Association. It will be an organisation not for 
gain and will not provide any assistance to its members in the form of financial or other 
assistance. It will aim to promote the common interests of tax practitioners. In order to 
achieve this, another objective links to this one, being the aim of the Association to 
maintain and preserve the integrity and status of the profession. SARS, in its discussion 
documents, indicates that the Association will: 
take any steps which may be necessary to stop or prevent dishonorable conduct 
and practices by members, for this purpose to hold enquiries into the conduct of 
members and to take disciplinary action against members, including the 
termination of their membership and their expulsion from the Association. 
This indicates that the Association will formulate its own code of conduct. The problem, 
however, is that many members who will form part of the regulatory Board, will already 
be members of existing professional bodies. Codes of conduct already exist for these 
professional bodies and SAICA, for example, has a stringent disciplinary process. 
Similarly, however, a large number of members will not belong to any established 
professional body. Therefore some form of balance needs to be sought, to avoid 
duplication of effort. The current proposal therefore tends to over-regulate the members 
who are already regulated in terms of an existing body, possibly also resulting in higher 
subscription fees for those members, as fees will be paid to two associations. The 
positive side of this objective is that by preventing dishonorable conduct of all its 
members, the Association will assist in the protection of the taxpayers, making it possible 
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for taxpayers to report any tax practitioner belonging to the Association, where 
misconduct occurs. 
(b) To advance the theory and practice of taxation 
A further objective of the Association is to advance the theory and practice of taxation in 
all respects. This object appears to be vague. It is not clear if this refers to the members 
of the Association only or if it, in addition, will be applicable to the taxpaying public at 
large. J H Dijkman, in a submission (2003:3), states that SAICA believes that the 
advancement of the theory and practice of taxation in relation to the taxpaying public is 
the "responsibility of our Government". He further states that "it is important that the 
responsibilities of Government in improving taxpayer education is not passed on to this 
body as we do not see this as one of the objects of this body". This requirement would 
pose an onerous task for the Association, resulting in higher fees and less focus being 
placed on the most important object of the Association being that of regulation. Another 
objective identified that ties in with the advancement of taxation is the proposal by SARS 
that the Association should "provide for research into taxation and kindred matters and to 
provide members with information on developments in professional thoughts on methods 
both inside and outside the Republic of South Africa" (SARS, 2002b: 16). Similarly this 
object is again very onerous which could significantly add to the cost of operating the 
Association and this cost would again have to be borne by the members of the 
Association through increased subscriptions, and ultimately their clients. SAICA has 
indicated that this too is an area of Government responsibility, in that Government carries 
out its own research before any new tax legislation is introduced or amendments are 
made. SARS publishes any new developments or legislation on its website which is 
freely available to all tax practitioners and the tax-paying public. In addition a number of 
professional bodies to which current tax practitioners belong have a tax page on their 
websites or in their monthly bulletins, or tax update courses which provide members with 
the requisite knowledge they need on any tax amendments or legislation which impacts 
upon the profession. A consideration for the Association could be to provide a portal link 
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on its website through to the SARS website and the SAICA tax page, as an example. 
This would siguificantly decrease costs and the duplication of effort. 
(c) To speak with one voice and allow for exchange of views 
The proposal states that the Association will aim to speak with one voice. In interpreting 
this statement it appears as if the Association would want all its members to have the 
same views and opinions. This however, may not be possible as members forming part 
of the Association will in most cases already belong to another professional body, which 
has its own rules and regulations. Members of various bodies may also not express the 
same views on all tax-related matters. This could possibly be interpreted as providing a 
mouthpiece for members of the Association, to express their mutually agreed-upon 
opinion. The proposal that the Association will allow for members to exchange their 
views on various matters is a good one, however the forum in which to address these 
views needs to be considered. If the Association wishes to provide courses, seminars and 
other presentations for members, as stated in the proposal, these could then be used as a 
platform whereby views could be exchanged. Workshops and functions, however, tend 
to be very costly and in most cases tax updates or workshops are already offered by other 
professional institutions. Therefore, in order to minimise the cost to the member, the 
workshops may need to be consolidated and either the Association take over all training 
and events or outsource it to the professional bodies who already offer these. Should the 
Association wish to take on this task it would have to employ trainers or event co-
coordinators which would therefore increase costs and again result in increased 
membership fees and increased fees for clients. In addition, the proposal refers to the 
provision of courses, seminars and presentations to other professions and the public. This 
task, however, should rest with the Government, as the Government implements the law 
and, as such, should provide the knowledge and training to the public on these 
regulations. The statement by JH Dijkman (2003: 1 0) that "taxpayer education is a crucial 
element of improved compliance by taxpayers" enforces the idea that taxpayers need to 
be informed of the regulations. By whom the information should be provided should be 
carefully considered. 
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(d) To co-operate at all times with SARS and the National Treasury and pass comment on 
actual or impending legislation 
The two objectives mentioned above appear to be conflicting. If SARS or National 
Treasury are the implementers of legislation and the enforcers of compliance with 
legislation, it does not appear possible for the Association to be able to pass comment on 
actual or impending legislation and, while cooperating with SARS, to remain 
independent in this task. It is necessary for the Association to co-operate with these two 
organs of State by ensuring that the members comply with the legislation imposed by 
these organs. However, the wording in the object in the proposal reads "to co-operate at 
all times" (SARS, 2002b: 17). If this is indeed the intention the object could be construed 
to mean that the Association would not be able to express an independent view on any 
proposed legislation and would not be able to object to it, even if the members fully 
believe that it would not be in the best interest of the country to implement to the new tax 
legislation. This objective would need to be carefully considered. 
The proposal continues to list several other objectives of the Association. Of these, one 
objective that stands out and is very important, is the objective to "prescribe the 
qualifications and/or experience to be obtained by any person wishing to become a 
member" (SARS, 2002b: 17). This is discussed in further detail later in this chapter 
where the admission requirements are reviewed. The remaining objectives are not too 
onerous and would not have too severe an impact on the costs of membership. Amongst 
these would be for the Association to apply for membership and co-operate with national 
and international borlies specific to the interests of the profession, to publish a list of 
members from time to time, to administer amicable rlispute settlements and to do such 
other things that may be incidental to achieving the objectives of the organisation. It 
would appear that what the document refers to as objectives are more in the nature of 
goals established to meet the objectives of protecting the tax base and the taxpaying 
public. 
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Composition of the Board 
According to the proposal the Association "should be managed by a representative Board 
drawn from members of the Association who are resident in the Republic together with 
one representative each nominated by SARS and the National Treasury" (SARS, 
2002b: 17). SARS and National Treasury, would therefore not act as the regulator of 
this Board. This is a key element in ensuring that the Association is seen to be and is in 
fact independent of SARS, thereby providing it with more credibility. It is important that 
the Board be completely autonomous from SARS. According to SAICA in a further 
submission (Arendse,2005:3), "if the intention behind the regulation is to protect the 
public interest, then it is inappropriate for the regulation to be carried out by SARS, as 
this approach would reduce the regulatory Board to no more than another tax -collection 
arm". In addition members of the public would be less likely to use tax practitioners who 
are regulated by SARS. If some tax practitioners happen to fall outside the regulation, 
this would then give them an unfair advantage, as members of the public would be more 
likely to utilise their services. Dijkrnan, JH in his letter to SARS (2003:4) states that "it 
is also important that the Board should consist of people with financial and business 
expertise as well as knowledge of the tax profession, in order to playa meaningful role." 
The Board will also need to playa strong oversight role in order to assist the Association 
in achieving its objectives. 
Membership and qualifications 
The proposal issued by SARS puts forward a two-tiered membership structure and assists 
with creating a profession with tiers of regulation. The first tier consists of members 
entitled to limited practice and the second members entitled to full practice. In order for 
the Association to function correctly and the regulation to be effective, it is important that 
different categories of membership be introduced and maintained. The fact that some 
practitioners carry out compliance work only, this being the completion and submission 
of various tax-related returns to SARS, whereas others provide opinions or advice, in 
itself drives the necessity for various categories of membership. It is necessary, however, 
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to determine whether the proposed two tiers will be effective in catering for the all the 
current and future tax practitioners. 
Members who are entitled to limited practice are only allowed to prepare returns and 
associated functions. According to SARS (2002b: 17): 
A member entitled to limited practice is only permitted to represent taxpayers in 
respect of an application for extension, deferred payment arrangements, query, 
audit or objection in relation to a return he/she is preparing or prepared and is not 
permitted to represent taxpayers in respect of any other tax matter. 
In addition, these members can only represent the taxpayer for the period covered by the 
return they have prepared. In order to become a member with limited practice certain 
entrance requirements have to be met. These entrance requirements are broken down into 
academic qualification and experience. If an applicant is only going to prepare and file 
tax returns of individuals who are not directors of companies and who do not earn a 
taxable income above the marginal tax rate, no academic requirements are necessary. 
These applicants, however, "must demonstrate that they have completed 2000 hours of 
relevant South African tax work in the preceding five years" (SARS, 2002b: 18). If, 
however, an applicant is going to prepare and file tax returns for any person other than as 
mentioned in the first instance above, he or she is required to have passed at least one 
course in accounting and taxation at any South African university, technikon or another 
approved institution. In addition, these applicants are required to have completed "1200 
hours of relevant South African tax work in the preceding three years" (SARS, 
2002b:18). In each instance experience is necessary with regard to relevant tax work. 
Relevant tax work in terms of the proposal (SARS, 2002b: 19) includes: 
(a) completing and submitting any tax return of an individual or any other tax 
return as permitted respectively; 
(b) responding to queries of a routine nature, for example a request for a schedule 
ofbad debts, raised by SARS regarding any tax administered by SARS; and 
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(c) drafting objections to tax assessments of an administrative nature, for example 
arising out of arithmetic errors. 
The second level of membership proposed by SARS is members who would be entitled to 
full practice. These members would be able to provide a full spectrum of tax-related 
services, not limited as in the first type of membership mentioned above. Similarly both 
academic qualifications and experience are a requirement. The minimum academic 
requirements according to SARS (2002b: 18) are: 
(a) A bachelor degree from a South African university or a four year degree from 
a South African technikon, or an approved equivalent. 
(b) Either as part of the qualification or as extra courses, the applicant must have 
passed at least two courses in: 
1. Accounting, 
11. Commercial or mercantile law; and 
iii. South African taxation. (One of these taxation courses should be at 
fourth year or postgraduate level, for example a Honours degree including 
taxation, a Higher Diploma including taxation or an Advanced Certificate 
in Taxation.) 
(c) An applicant is still eligible for admission if only one course has been 
completed in up to two of the three categories in (b), subject to the increased 
experience requirements ... 
In addition to the above qualification requirements, expenence is a necessity. An 
applicant who has passed two courses in each of the above categories must complete 
1200 hours of relevant tax work in South Africa in three preceding years prior to 
application. "Applicants who have passed one course in one of the categories above and 
at least two courses in two of the categories above must demonstrate that they have 
completed 1800 hours of relevant South African tax work in the preceding three years" 
(SARS, 2002b: 19). The qualification and experience requirements appear to have an 
inverse relationship in this proposal, the more qualified an applicant is, the less 
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expenence is required. This might not necessarily be an advantage as practical 
expenence is required in most instances to test theories and those highly qualified 
individuals might require just as much experience in dealing with complex tax issues as 
those with courses in two or three of the categories above requiring 2400 hours of 
experience. The experience required in order to be accepted as a member entitled to full 
practice according to SARS (2002b:20) is: 
(a) Completing and submitting income tax returns, other than income tax 
returns for individuals who are not directors of companies and who earn a 
taxable income of less than that at which the maximum marginal rate 
applies; 
(b) Responding to queries raised by SARS, other than queries of a routine 
nature, for example a request for a schedule of bad debts; 
(c) Drafting objections to tax assessments or decisions, other than objections 
of an administrative nature, for example arising out of arithmetic errors; 
(d) Preparing for appeals, or assisting in preparing for appeals, in respect of 
tax assessments or decisions; and 
(e) Giving considered written opinions regarding tax matters. 
The experience requirements referred to above do not appear to be exhaustive as no 
mention is made of experience gained in large corporate tax transactions, international 
tax such as transfer pricing, estate planning and liquidations, amongst other more 
complicated tax arenas. Surely some form of experience in these complicated tax arenas 
would be required for a member to be entitled to full practice in order to make the tiered 
approach to regulation complete and reliant? 
A concern raised in relation to the proposal by Dijkman JH (2003:3) is that "the 
admission requirements, and particularly proof of previous experience, may be a major 
obstacle to the inclusion of previously disadvantaged individuals in the regulated tax 
industry". Achieving the number of hours of experience set out in the proposal may 
present a difficulty for some tax practitioners as, in most instances, tax work is not 
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exclusive and most tax practitioners spend a lot of their time with the provision of other 
professional services. In addition, if one tax practitioner spends a lot of time in one field 
of tax work, it may not necessarily make him or her more competent than another 
practitioner in that field . The proposal requires that proof of hours be maintained. This 
may also present a problem for professionals as in most instances professionals may not 
document exactly the number of hours that were spent in a particular area of work. It 
also refers to "associate members", the meaning of which is not clear. A possible 
interpretation of this statement expressed by Dijkman JH (2003:7) is "that members of 
existing, recognised professional bodies, such as SAICA, be granted associate 
membership, in view of the fact that SAICA has an existing Code of Professional 
Conduct, and educational and practical experience requirements". If a member does 
indeed become classed as an "associate member" what would this then mean? Would 
they automatically become members of the Association with lower membership fees? 
Would they be exempt from meeting the academic and experience requirements? Wbich 
body would ultimately prevail over this member should the need for disciplinary enquiry 
arise? Consistency could become a problem and no guidance has been provided in the 
proposal as to how the "associate members" would be administered. The proposal 
appears to contain many gaps in the area of membership and is vague as it does not 
specify how members will apply, how the administration requirements of overseeing the 
membership will be addressed, what would happen to current tax practitioners who do 
not have the required qualifications and how the work actually performed by a limited or 
full member would be monitored to ensure that it fits within the scope of that 
membership category. 
The proposal also discusses at length the punishable offences of members and how 
membership could be cancelled. 
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Punishable offences and cancellation of membership 
The discussion document contains a long list of offences that, if committed by the 
member, will be punishable. The proposal, however, does not detail what the punishment 
will be. It does state that "the Disciplinary Committee may in its discretion order the 
cancellation of the membership of any member who is found guilty of committing a 
punishable offence" (SARS, 2002b:22). However, with each offence being different and 
in some cases more serious the reader of the proposal would expect the punishment to fit 
the crime. No mention, however, is made of varying forms of disciplinary action to be 
taken or the methods or procedures that should be implemented by the disciplinary 
committee. It also does not elaborate on how monitoring of the members will be 
maintained or the avenue through which a punishable offence could be reported. Is this 
not similar to what is currently happening in South Africa under the non-regulated 
system? The proposal does not seem to offer more protection to the taxpayer, but merely 
lists an offence that will be punishable, but not how the perpetrator of the offence would 
be punished. It is also does not make reference to any current tax legislation that relates 
to punishment of a tax offense. The type of offences that SARS would deem 
inappropriate and therefore punishable include, inter alia (SARS, 2002b:20): 
(a) In respect of a member entitled to limited practice, performing the 
following: 
(i) Representing a client in matters other than those pertaining to the 
preparation and submission of tax returns, applications for 
extensions, deferred payment arrangements, queries, audits or 
objections; 
(ii) Representing a client concerning a tax liability for a year or period 
covered by a return not prepared by him or her; or 
(iii) Signing of any tax return, any request for the extension of time in 
respect of the submission of any tax return or any deferred 
payment arrangement on behalf of a client without the express 
written consent of that client on each occasion; 
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(b) Conducting himself or herself with gross negligence in connection with 
any work performed by him or her in his or her profession or employment; 
(c) Performing the following without exercising due diligence: 
(i) Preparing or assisting in the preparing, approving, and submission 
of tax returns, affidavits and other documents relating to tax 
matters; 
(ii) Determining the reasonability of oral or written representations 
made to him or her by clients relating to tax matters; or 
(iii) Determining the correctness of oral or written representations 
made by him or her to clients relating to tax matters; 
(d) Unreasonably delaying the prompt disposition of any matter before SARS; 
(e) Knowingly giving false or misleading information in connection with tax 
matters or participating in such activity; 
(f) Directly or indirectly attempting to influence the official action of SARS 
employees by the use of threats, false accusations, duress, or coercion, or 
by offering gifts, favors, or any special inducements; 
(g) Using abusive language, making false accusations and statements knowing 
them to be false, circulating or publishing malicious or libelous matter, or 
engaging in any contemptuous conduct in connection with practice before 
SARS; 
(h) Giving a false opinion knowingly, recklessly, or through gross 
incompetence; or following a pattern of providing incompetent opinions in 
questions arising under the tax laws; 
(i) Directly or indirectly paying a person, other than a fellow member, a 
commission or giving such person monetary or other consideration, as 
remuneration for bringing the member work, or for inducing other persons 
to give work to the member; 
CD Accepting directly or indirectly any commission, brokerage or other 
remuneration in respect of professional or commercial business referred to 
others as an incident to his or her service to any client, except with the 
knowledge and consent of that client; 
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(k) Improperly obtaining or attempting to obtain work; 
(I) Soliciting or advertising or canvassing in the Republic (or in any territory 
outside the Republic designated by the Board from time to time) in any 
manner not permitted by the Rules or Code of Professional Conduct 
prescribed by the Board from time to time; 
(m) Willfully refusing or failing to perform or conform with any of the 
provisions of the By-laws which it is his or her duty to do; 
(n) Committing a breach of any Rule or Code of Professional Conduct 
prescribed by the Board or, after having been previously warned by the 
Board or any committee appointed by it, continuing to commit a breach of 
such Rules or Code of Professional Conduct; 
(0) Unlawfully failing to account for, or unreasonably delaying an accounting 
for any money or propertY received for or on behalf of a client or any 
other person when called upon to do so; 
(P) Conducting himself or herself in a manner which, in the opinion of the 
Disciplinary Committee, is discreditable, dishonorable, dishonest, 
irregular or unworthy or which is derogatory to the Association, or tends 
to bring the profession of tax practitioners into disrepute; 
(q) Without reasonable cause fails to resign from a professional appointment 
when requested by the client to do so; 
(r) Fails to answer or deal appropriately within a reasonable time any 
correspondence or other communication from the Association or any other 
person which requires a reply or response; 
(s) Fails to comply within a reasonable time with an order, requirement or 
request from the Association; or 
(t) Fails after demand to pay any subscription or any fee, levy or other charge 
payable to the Association. 
The punishable offences mentioned above, are merely listed in the discussion document 
and no further detail is provided on punishment, other than dismissal of the member from 
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the Association at the discretion of the committee. It is further stated (SARS, 2002b:22) 
that cancellation of membership may be effected if a member is: 
(i) Removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct; or 
(ii) Convicted of theft, fraud, forgery, or uttering a forged document or perjury 
and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment without the option of a 
fme or to a fine of an amount to be determined by the Board .. . 
Other instances, such as sequestration of a member as an example, also will result in 
cancellation of membership. 
The discussion document further states that a code of conduct may be established by the 
Association and, according to SARS (2002b:23), if established would contain aspects 
such as: 
(a) Objectives 
(b) Integrity and Objectivity; 
(c) Conflicts of Interest; 
(d) Professional Competence; 
(e) Confidentiality; 
(f) Fees for Professional Services; 
(g) Clients ' Monies; 
(h) Recruiting. 
Each item is merely listed in the proposal and no further information is provided on each 
requirement that could be contained in the code of conduct. These headings seem to be 
very similar to those contained in existing codes of conduct of other professional bodies. 
Funding 
It has been indicated in the proposal that SARS will fund the regulatory Board for the 
first year and thereafter that the Board will have to be self funding. There is no clarity 
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provided in the proposal as to how the self funding will operate and what form of 
membership fees members could be expected to pay. If the Association is to fulftll all the 
objectives mentioned above then the cost to the tax practitioners could become very 
large. This in tum will be passed on to the taxpayer through increased fees . Arendse 
(2005,7) puts forward a proposal stating that "our view is that the regulatory Board must 
be streamlined as far as possible to minimise the cost to the tax practitioners, which is 
one of the key concerns regarding regulation". She further states that "in essence, all that 
the regulatory Board should do is to set the criteria for admission, establish a code of 
professional conduct and a clear constitution, maintain a database of members and act on 
complaints". A further suggestion made by Arendse (2005,7) regarding the setting of 
fees is that "fees paid by tax practitioners, as members of the regulatory Board, should 
vary according to the extent that they rely on, or make use of, the Board ... specifically 
SAICA members who register with the Board should be on a different fee structure due 
to the fact the disciplinary measures and regulation will be carried out by SAICA, with 
the cooperation and oversight of the board, whereas other practitioners who are not 
otherwise regulated, will be fully reliant on the regulation and disciplinary processes of 
the board, and their fee structure should be adapted accordingly". 
Conclusion 
The SARS discussion document is lengthy and contains many areas of concern, as 
highlighted in the paragraphs above. Specific problem areas contained in the proposal 
have been discussed and are summarised below. 
Firstly the requirement for the Association to establish its own code of conduct, could 
result in a duplication of effort, increased costs and possibly a conflict of interest for 
members of existing professional bodies. Other objectives contained in the proposal 
which could result in a conflict of interest are the requirement for members of the 
Association to speak with one voice and to co-operate at all times with SARS and the 
National Treasury. In some instances it was found, in the opinion of the writer, that the 
objectives tend to over-regulate members already belonging to other professional bodies. 
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In addition, other objectives such as "to advance the theory and practice in taxation" and 
"to provide for research into taxation and kindred matters and to provide members with 
information on developments in professional thoughts on methods" (SARS, 2002b: 17), 
tend to be vague and onerous which could result in significantly increased costs. 
Besides the concerns raised above concerning the objectives, the composition of the 
Board is questionable. If SARS have a representative on the Board, the public might be 
less likely to use tax practitioners regulated by SARS and the Board will not be seen to be 
completely autonomous from SARS. Thirdly the admission requirements concerning 
qualification and experience need to be reviewed. Achieving the number of hours of 
experience required may be difficult and proof of experience may be difficult to motivate 
as, in most instances, tax work is not exclusive. In addition, further guidance is required 
on the meaning of an "associate member" and who would be given this title and under 
what circumstances. Two further omissions in the proposal are that of punishment of 
members and the forms of punishment to be enforced, and the method and extent of the 
funding of the Association. 
With all the above-mentioned contentious areas in mind, SARS has put forward the 
model as a proposal and called for comments to be made on the proposals set out, or 
suggestions for alternative models. According to SARS (2002b:23) it invited comments 
specifically in the areas of: 
(a) The definition of "tax-related services" to be regulated; 
(b) The need for more than one category of tax practitioner; 
(c) Academic requirements; 
(d) Experience requirements; 
(e) Punishable offences; and 
(f) Transitional arrangements. 
Comments have been sent in to SARS over the years suggesting that the initial proposal 
contained many flaws or possibly contained too many onerous requirements. One such 
comment was from Dijkman J H, (2003:2) in which he stated that: 
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the purpose of the proposed Association is primarily to regulate tax practitioners, 
as opposed to being a 'club' established for the benefit of its members and to 
promote tax practitioners. As such, its primary functions should be limited in 
order to regulate: 
• Entry levels and to set requirements for membership; 
• Registration of members and maintaining membership records; 
• Monitoring service levels of members; and 
• Discipline. 
The proposed Association should therefore not get involved with activities more 
associated with a "club", that is presentations, research, education, newsletters or 
providing similar membership and public benefits. 
The more activities the Association provides, obviously the more it would cost a member 
and what additional purpose would this serve for a member? The formation of the 
Association as described in the SARS discussion document would result in a higher cost 
to the taxpayer, as the member would need to compensate for the increased membership 
fees by increasing tax compliance and consultancy fees. Due to the fact that the current 
proposal seems to overcompensate on regulation rather that address the specific needs of 
regulation, it is necessary to explore alternative models that could perhaps have a more 
appropriate effect and approach to regulation. 
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CHAPTER 4 - EV ALVATION OF THE MODEL OF THE ESTATE AGENCY 
AFFAIRS BOARD AND COMPARISON WITH THE SARS 
MODEL 
Introduction 
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, the proposal issued by SARS for the 
regulation of the tax advisory profession contained lengthy and onerous requirements. In 
addition it left many unanswered questions and a great uncertainty as to how the 
Association would ultimately operate once established and whether, possibly, the 
objectives were too detailed and should be less prescriptive and more focused in order to 
achieve the desired goal of regulation. SARS had previously indicated that the model 
closest to that which it wished to create for tax industry regulation was that of the Estate 
Agency Affairs Board (EAAB). This chapter therefore explores this model and 
determines whether, in fact, the proposal drafted by SARS aligned itself closely to the 
EAAB model and whether any differences give scope to improve the regulation model of 
SARS. 
Establishment of the EAAB 
According to the skills work plan of the EAAB (2005a:2) "the EAAB was established by 
an Act of Parliament on the 5 July 1976 after an extensive investigation into the necessity 
or otherwise of doing so. The Department of Trade and Industry had become convinced 
that the self-regulation of the industry was not to the benefit of consumers. It had 
become apparent that statutory regulation was required to maintain and promote the 
integrity of estate agency, and consequently the interests of consumers". The EAAB was 
therefore formed and operates in terms ofthe Estate Agency Affairs Act No. 112 of 1976 
(the EAA Act). The EAA Act has been amended occasionally from its inception " in 
order to afford additional protection to consumers and to effectively regulate the 
industry" (EAAB, 2005a:2). The last amendment occurred in 1998 "when the name of 
the EAAB was change to the Estate Agency Affairs Board, in order to remove the 
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common misconception that the Board was constituted to protect estate agents rather than 
to regulate the industry to the benefit of estate agents and consumers alike" (EAAB, 
2005a:2). According to SAICA (2005:1) the purpose of the EAAB is to "regulate the 
estate agency industry by licensing practitioners". The vision of the EAAB as expressed 
in its skills work plan (2005a:2) is: 
to ensure that consumers are fully protected in their dealings with estate agents 
and understand their rights, transactions, obligations and ethical behavior. 
In promoting and maintaining the standard of conduct of estate agents, the Board 
will also ensure proper compliance by estate agents with the provisions of the 
Estate Agency Affairs Act and the Code of Conduct and protect consumers 
against unprofessional estate agents. 
The mission is similarly expressed in this document as being "to promote and improve 
the quality standard of estate agents in general, having due regard to the public interest" 
(EAAB, 2005a:2). The Board therefore has a clearly established vision and mission 
which are aligned to its main purpose, being that of regulation of estate agents to protect 
clients. This clear direction is lacking in the SARS proposal, the vision and mission of 
the Association are not clearly stipulated. Objectives are listed, but no clear 
understanding is given as to the overall purpose of the Association. A vision and mission 
of an organisation help to establish focus and create strategic alignment. This would 
need to be carefully considered and thought out in the fmal draft proposal or legislation 
governing the implementation of the Association and its objectives. 
Requirements ofthe EAA Act 
According to SAICA (2005:1) there are certain stipulations contained in the EAA Act 
which "require that practitioners meet certain standards in order to become licensed and 
prohibits unethical conduct in the practice of estate agency". The EAA Act contains the 
following key requirements that would be applicable to a proposal concerning the 
regulation of tax practitioners: 
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(a) Constitution of the board 
The EAA Act reads as follows: 
(I) The board shall consist of fifteen members appointed under subsection (2) by 
the Minister. 
(2) The Minister shall appoint as members of the Board-
(a) five members from the estate agents' industry; 
(b) five members from civil society, representing consumer interest; and 
(c) five members from related professions and institutions such as the 
legal profession, fmancial institutions, property owners and 
developers. 
The EAA Act further stipulates the period for holding of office, the terms under which a 
member may be appointed and the terms under which a member will be required to 
vacate his or her office. In terms of the EAA Act there are set guidelines as to who may 
become a member, how many members should be representative of the board and 
instances in which membership will be cancelled. The SARS proposal, however, 
contains a paragraph consisting of three lines providing no indication as to how many 
members should be on the board, what requirements a member would need to be 
admitted to the board or what would prevent a member from being on the board, nor does 
it state the period of holding of office or the number of meetings to be held. This is 
obviously a serious concern as the Association cannot function and achieve its goals 
unless an appropriate board is set up and regulations in terms of its establishment are 
outlined and agreed upon. An important fact in setting up a board is its representative 
nature. It would be expected that the Board "should consist of people with fmancial and 
business expertise, as well as a knowledge of the tax profession, in order to play a 
meaningful role" (Dijkman, 2003:4). 
(b) Staff of the board and designation of inspectors 
According to the EAA Act section 6(2) "the board may designate persons appointed in 
terms of subsection (I) and any other persons who he may deem fit, to perform the 
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functions of inspectors under this Act subject to its control". Therefore in terms of the 
EAA Act the board will establish an inspectorate function in order to assist with 
monitoring compliance. It can be assumed from the objects of the board that this 
inspectorate function will aim to oversee and regulate the conduct and activities of estate 
agents. The skills work plan (2005a:3) further sets out the structure of the EAAB. 
According to this document the EAAB consists of a: "chief executive officer, human 
resources department, accounts department, legal department, claims department, IT 
department, records department, administrative department, information department and 
auxiliary services". The skills work plan further provides a breakdown of the 
occupational categories of the Board and provides for a total staff compliment of forty-
eight people. If the objectives as listed in the SARS proposal were to be carried through 
to the fmallegislation this would require a much larger structure than that of the EAAB. 
A technical, training, research, legislative and advisory department amongst others would 
additionally be required, resulting in far higher membership fees than those paid by estate 
agents, based on the structure of its Board. 
Although the main purpose of the SARS proposal is to set out a model that would attempt 
to regulate the tax industry in South Mrica, no mention is made in the model as to how, 
once a person becomes a member of the Association, he or she will be monitored. It does 
not stipulate that a division will be set up within the Association that will review work 
carried out by tax practitioners from time to time or address and investigate complaints, if 
received. The proposal contains no methods or procedures as to how the Association 
will achieve regulation and is very vague on this issue. It does not even list this as a key 
objective, being the regulation of conduct of members and how it will monitor whether 
the appropriate standard of conduct is being upheld. Towards the end of the proposal it 
refers to a code of professional conduct being implemented by the Association, but does 
not provide any detail on the requirements of the code or how adherence would be 
monitored. This point again demonstrates a gap within the SARS proposal. 
(c) Strategic objectives 
The EAA Act lists the objects of its board, these being to: 
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(a) maintain and promote the standard of conduct of estate agents; and 
(b) regulate the activities of estate agents. 
The above two objects are concise and to the point, therefore setting a standard of 
conduct for estate agents and regulating the activities of the agents. According to SAICA 
(200S: I) it achieves these objectives and regulation through the following means: 
• Preventing unsuitable persons from entering the industry; 
• Administering a qualifying examination for new applicants; 
• Investigating complaints concerning improper estate agency conduct and 
activity; 
• Imposing disciplinary sanction on estate agents found to have violated 
the licensing Act or Code of Conduct; and 
• Reimbursing consumers who have suffered financial loss through the theft by 
estate agents of trust monies, from its Fidelity Fund. 
The skills work plan further enhances on these two objectives by creating more detailed 
strategic objectives. The strategic objectives as listed in this document (200Sa:S) are: 
I. to effectively administer and improve service excellence; 
2. to improve the image of the EAAB and the stakeholders through better 
communication channels; 
3. to serve as real estate infonnation resource for all South Africans; 
4. to provide training and development for EAAB staff; 
S. to implement the vision and mission of the organisation through training and 
developing of staff; 
6. to ensure that licensed estate agents are competent and morally fit to act as 
real estate agents and salespersons; 
7. to ensure that licensed real estate agents comply with the real estate practice 
standards imposed by the regulatory authority; 
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8. to identify and address Issues affecting real estate consumers and 
practitioners; 
9. to effectively and efficiently administer the programmes and operations of the 
regulatory authority; 
10. to enhance standards, that is, to maintain procedures, evaluate applicants for 
honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, competency and legal qualifications; 
II. to increase the broad acceptance of the principles of mandatory continuing 
education through the approval of relevant courses perceived to provide value; 
and 
12. to redress past imbalances pertaining to the procurement of goods and 
services. 
The two objectives in terms of the EAA Act and certain strategic objectives as listed 
above are representative of the type of objectives that could be expected to appear in a 
document concerning the regulation of the tax industry. Strategic objective 3 may not be 
entirely applicable to the Association, as it will not constitute the only tax information 
source in South Afiica. Many existing professional bodies and SARS already have large 
databanks of information with regard to tax issues and regulations. In addition, strategic 
objective 6 is not clear as to how estate agent competency is evaluated. It is not clear 
whether the EAAB would provide training to the estate agents in order to ensure 
competency. This objective could be linked to a similar objective currently contained in 
the SARS proposal. However, as discussed in chapter 3, to provide training to members 
of the Association would be costly and possibly involve duplication of effort, as many 
existing bodies already provide tax training. 
The remaining strategic objectives of the EAAB could be applicable to the Association if 
amended slightly. In order to achieve regulation a standard for the conduct of tax 
practitioners must be set and the activities of the tax practitioners must be monitored and 
regulated. The SARS proposal, however, does not simply concentrate on achieving these 
two objectives, but lists fifteen key objectives of the Association, in total (refer to the 
previous chapter where the different objectives of the Association were discussed in 
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detail). The strategic objectives of the EAAB appear to be more concise that those listed 
in the SARS proposal and directly address the two key objectives as set out in the EAA 
Act. The SARS proposal merely lists the objectives but does not state how the 
Association will attempt to achieve the objectives. By including objectives such as 
providing research into taxation, passing comment on actual or impending legislation, 
providing courses, seminars and presentations and undertaking and advising on all 
matters which may be in the interest of the Association, makes the objectives very 
onerous. These objectives also tend to reduce the focus on the regulation of the tax 
profession and promote many other aims which are not directly linked to regulation. 
In addition it could be assumed that the cost of belonging to the EAAB, having only two 
key objectives to fulfil, versus the costs of belonging to the Association, having fifteen 
objectives to fulfil, would be significantly lower. By only having two key objectives the 
EAAB still achieves the aims it was initially set up for, one being to provide a service to 
members and secondly a protection of the public utilising services of their members. 
Earlier in 2005 it was indicated, in a discussion forum held by SAICA with its members, 
that the main object for the introduction of regulation of the tax industry by Trevor 
Manuel in his budget speech of 2002, was for public protection. If this is the main 
intention behind the regulation, then instead of creating a complex system involving high 
costs, a more simple structure with concise objectives could be developed and operated 
which is similar to that of the EAAB. 
(d) Core values 
The EAAB has also established a set of core values which could be assumed to form the 
basis of its code of conduct. In terms of the skills work plan (2005a:3 and 4) the core 
business values of the EAAB are based on the following: 
• efficiency and effectiveness; 
• professionalism; 
• ethics/discipline; 
• quality services; 
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• better communication and liaison with the Department of Trade and Industry; 
• honesty; 
• creativity; 
• service excellence; 
• corporate culture of caring; 
• enabling legislation invariably containing checks and balances to ensure that 
the regulator carries out its responsibilities as intended by govemment; 
• sound and transparent administration and control of fmancial affairs; 
• establishing education and research facilities so as to constitute a necessary 
corollary to technology and demographics; and 
• increasing public awareness of regulator services. 
These core values set out the values on which the EAAB is based and which it aims to 
uphold. It relates to how the Board conducts itself and is a form of code of conduct for 
the Board. SARS has not set out any such value system for the Association in its 
proposal. Perhaps this would be investigated and established once the Association is in 
operation? The core values of the EAAB are very significant and applicable also to what 
would be expected of a tax regulatory authority. Perhaps the Association could seek some 
guidance from these. 
(e) Committee of inquiry 
According the section 8B of the EAA Act: 
(i) The board may from time to time appoint such number of committees of 
inquiry as it deems fit, each consisting of at least three members ... 
(2) A committee of inquiry may exercise or perform any power or fimction which 
is granted or entrusted to it in terms of the Act. 
The EAA Act therefore makes provision for a committee of inquiry to be set up for the 
purposes of investigating any conduct by members which may be unacceptable. The 
proposal of SARS makes mention of a disciplinary committee that will be established. It 
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does not, however, state how this disciplinary committee will function, under which 
circumstances it will be required to operate or what level of punishment a disciplinary 
committee would be entitled to impose as a result of improper conduct. It merely makes 
mention of twenty instances of punishable offences. It does not include details on the 
type of punishment to impose to fit the crime. The EAA Act, however, contains section 
30 which provides detail on the improper conduct of estate agents and what punishments 
will be implemented. 
(f) Improper conduct by estate agents 
Most of the forms of improper conduct referred to in terms of section 30 of the EAA Act 
are specific to the Estate Agents' industry. Only two instances may be applicable to the 
tax industry: 
(I) Any estate agent shall be guilty of improper conduct if he -
(e) contravenes any provision of the code of conduct referred to in section 
8(b) or fails to comply with any such provision; and 
(h) commits an offence involving an element of dishonesty. 
Subsection (e) of section 30 refers to the code of conduct of the EAAB. The EAAB has 
an established code of conduct which regulates the conduct of estate agents. It contains 
the following sections (EAABb, 2005: 1-8): 
2 general duty to protect the public interest; 
3 mandates; 
4 duty to disclose; 
5 duty not to make misrepresentations or false statements or to use harmful 
marketing techniques; 
6 duties in respect of offers and contracts; 
7 prohibition against undue influence; 
8 remuneration; 
9 trust money and interest; 
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10 confidentiality; and 
II vicarious responsibility. 
Each section contains detailed information and guidance as to what is expected of the 
estate agent. Most requirements are specific to the estate agency industry. However, due 
to the fact that the SARS proposal has provided no detail on the actual code of conduct, 
simply listing the possible sections it could contain, the information as contained in the 
estate agent's code of conduct could be used as a basis when the Association is formed. 
Other codes of conduct such as the code enforced by SAICA, for example, could be 
utilised as a basis. 
The EAA Act further states that if there is a charge of misconduct, the committee of 
inquiry may investigate it in the prescribed manner. In terms of section 30 (3) of the 
EAAAct: 
when any estate agent is found guilty of conduct deserving sanction by the board 
or committee of inquiry, the board or committee of inquiry may-
(a) withdraw the fidelity fund certificate of such estate agent ... ; 
(b) impose on such estate agent a fme not exceeding R25 000 or such higher 
amount as may be prescribed ... ; or 
(c) reprimand such estate agent. 
The EAA Act lists specific punishments to be imposed as a result of an offence. This, 
however, is not specified in the proposal of SARS relating to tax practitioner regulation. 
The proposal lists a number of punishable offences all having varying degrees of severity, 
which would surely require punishment of varying degrees of severity? The only 
punishment referred to in the SARS proposal is cancellation of membership if a member 
commits a punishable offence. Surely not all of the offences listed in the proposal would 
warrant cancellation of membership? The proposal therefore does not contain sufficient 
information as to how improper conduct would be dealt with. 
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Funding of the EAAB 
With regard to funding, the board sets prescribed levies which are paid by estate agents. 
This aspect of funding is lacking in the proposal of SARS. Future members cannot 
ascertain from the proposal what costs would be borne by themselves or what the 
registration fee would be. In addition there may be duplication of activities in certain 
areas, as many members already belong to other professional bodies, paying high 
sUbscriptions. Therefore there is a concern about issues of cost. 
Membership of the EAAB 
An entrance examination is required to be written by a prospective member of the EAAB 
and any individual is eligible to write this examination, there are no restrictions. Once 
the examination is passed the estate agent then can apply for a Fidelity Fund Certificate. 
"OnIy on issue of the Fidelity Fund Certificates, may such estate agent commence 
operations" (EAAB, 2005c:2). There is also a tiered approach if an individual chooses to 
study to become an estate agent. The third and highest tier is that of a principal estate 
agent. In order to be admitted as this level of membership, a level 5 or 6 qualification as 
listed on the national qualifications framework needs to have been attained prior to the 
writing of the entrance exam. The second tier is that of a non-principal estate agent. In 
order to be admitted on this level and to be allowed to carry out the functions associated 
with this level, a level 4 qualification on the national qualification framework needs to be 
attained. The first level is that of a candidate estate agent where onIy a level 1 or 2 
qualification on the national qualifications framework need be attained. The attaining of 
qualifications at the various levels on the national qualifications framework is not a 
necessity and according to the EAAB (2005c: 1) full status can be acquired by: 
• passing an Estate Agency Affairs Board examination; or 
• having served a year's candidature under the supervision and control of a 
qualified estate agent; or 
• having been exempted from the prescribed training. 
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This profession is less complex than that of the tax profession and the regulation of the 
tax profession cannot be directly aligned to this criteria. Tax professionals are required in 
some instances to provide advice on which taxpayers rely or to compute complex tax 
calculations which could have serious financial and other consequences for the taxpayer 
if calculated incorrectly. Therefore it is necessary to develop more stringent entrance 
requirements for the regulation of the tax industry. The SARS proposal has addressed 
this to a certain extent by putting forward a two-tiered membership approach. This, 
however, might not be the most appropriate. This point was again the focus of discussion 
in the forum held between SAICA and its members early in 2005 where many members 
felt that SAICA members should be exempt from the admission requirements stipulated 
in the SARS proposal. It was felt that membership to the Association should be 
automatically provided if a person belonged to either SAICA or the legal profession, for 
example. In addition a reduction of membership fees should be considered. 
Conclnsion 
As can be seen in the preceding paragraphs the EAA Act is concIse and contains 
legislation appropriate to achieving its two key objectives. The EAAB itself is "not 
content to be complacent and continuously seeks to improve its effectiveness and 
efficiency and, in so doing, to remain a worthy regulator of the industry and protector of 
consumers" (EAAB, 2005:2-3). Much of the legislation contained in the Act is specific 
to the estate agency industry; however the features comparable with the tax profession 
have been outlined in the paragraphs above. 
In summary, there a few key features contained in the functionality of the EAAB, that 
SARS could adopt. The EAAB has a clearly established vision and mission, specific 
guidelines are set indicating who may become a member of the Board, how many 
members should be on the Board, the period of holding of office, number of meetings, the 
requirements for admission and instances in which membership will be cancelled. These 
features are clearly lacking in the SARS proposal. The structure and operations of the 
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EAAB are simplified and clearly laid out in the EAA Act. In comparison, the SARS 
proposal listed, inter alia, fifteen objectives and a much larger structure would be 
required to operate the Association effectively. In addition, the EAAB has an established 
inspectorate division and committee of inquiry which monitors compliance. Again, this is 
a gap in the SARS proposal, as no mention is made of how a member of the Association 
will be monitored. The EAAB has an established set of core values which form its basis. 
SARS, however, has referred to no similar value system in the proposal concerning the 
Association. In addition, the EAAB lists specific forms of punishment and prescribes 
levies in terms of funding, which aspects are clearly lacking in the proposal of SARS. 
The only area in which the EAAB principles cannot be adopted or utilised by SARS in 
the formation of the Association is with regard to membership qualifications and 
experience requirements. The estate agency profession is less complex than that of the 
tax system and the entrance requirements are therefore much simpler. 
When comparing these features to those documented in the SARS proposal it appears that 
the SARS proposal has become too complicated and onerous in many areas. The 
objectives are lengthy and focus is lost with regard to the main aim of the proposed 
Association. If SARS had aligned the proposal more closely with that of the EAAB, the 
key concerns of current tax practitioners would possibly be addressed. In order to 
develop a model best suited to South Africa it is possibly advisable to explore a model of 
a tax regulatory system currently operating effectively in another country. The next 
chapter will therefore review the rules and regulations contained in the Australian Tax 
Agent's Board. 
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CHAPTER 5 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX 
AGENTS BOARD AND COMPARISON WITH THE SARS 
MODEL 
Introduction 
As concluded in chapter 4, the EAAB is not the most suitable model on which to base tax 
regulation in South Africa. The entrance requirements of its members in relation to 
qualifications and experience are too low and would not cater for the complexity of the 
tax industry in South Africa. In addition the obj ectives and aim of the Board may be too 
simple to achieve the desired balance as expressed by Izel du Plessis (2003:9) as being: 
i'a balance between abuse and monopoly, a balance between market forces and 
legislation, and a balance between the interests of SARS, taxpayers and tax 
practitioners". The model of the Australian Tax Agents Board (ATAB) might be more 
closely aligned to the desired model which South Africa would wish to implement, as 
expressed in the proposal ofSARS. The model of the ATAB is examined in depth in this 
chapter in order to identify the similarities and differences between it and the SARS 
proposal and to establish whether the model of the AT AB is more suitable for South 
African tax regulation, in the light of the conceptual regulatory framework suggested in 
chapter 3. 
Roles and objectives of the Board 
In Australia, tax agents are seen to playa very important role in the administration of the 
tax system. Regulation of these agents in Australia was "aimed at protecting the public 
by ensuring that persons who charge a fee for providing taxation related services have 
appropriate knowledge of the Australian income tax law, relevant accounting principles, 
and are otherwise fit and proper persons to be registered as tax agents" (ATAB, 2005a: 1). 
In order to achieve this regulation the AT AB was constituted in terms of Part VIlA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA36). It comprises of a Board in each State, 
which are independent statutory bodies acting autonomously in the execution of its 
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duties. Each Board consists of three members. According to the ATAB (2005a:l) "one 
member is an officer of the Australian Tax Office (A TO) and the other two members 
traditionally come from the legal and accounting professions". In comparison with the 
EAAB consisting of fifteen members and the SARS proposal which does not stipulate the 
number of members, but merely stipulates that at least one must be a representative from 
SARS and another a representative from National Treasury, the ATAB has three board 
members which fairly represent the professions affected by tax regulation. Although the 
ATAB includes a member who is an officer of the ATO (similar to the SARS 
representative on the proposed Association Board), it is clearly stated in the ATAB 
(2005a: 1) that "the deliberations of the Board are completely independent and the 
Commissioner of Taxation has no control over the proceedings of the Board". This 
clearly contrasts with a loosely-formulated requirement in the SARS document where the 
Association is required "to co-operate at all times with SARS and National Treasury" 
(SARS, 2002b: 17). 
The AT AB (2005a: 1) further sets out the responsibilities of the board as being, "to 
administer the tax agent registration requirements" and being "responsible for 
determining the suitability of applicants to be registered as tax agents, dealing with 
complaints about tax agents and ensuring that proper standards are maintained across the 
tax agent profession". Each of these areas of responsibility is discussed in more detail 
below. It can be established, however, that when comparing the objectives of the EAAB 
to those of the ATAB, the objectives of the ATAB are more closely aligned to the tax 
profession and are more onerous than simply maintaining a standard of conduct or 
regulating the activities of agents. In addition the objectives of the AT AB are more 
focused on achieving regulation than the objectives as listed in the SARS proposal, where 
objectives such as passing comment on proposed legislation, providing for research into 
taxation and providing courses, seminars and training events, for example, are included. 
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Admission requirements to practise as a tax agent 
In terms of SARS (2002b:4 to 5) in Australia "a person must be registered as a tax agent 
to charge a fee for preparing or lodging income tax returns and objections, or for 
transacting business on behalf of a taxpayer in income tax matters". Once a tax agent 
registers with the AT AB a certificate of registration is granted to the tax agent and he or 
she is allocated a reference number. This certificate is required to be displayed in the tax 
agent's office and the registration number is to be quoted on all tax returns lodged by the 
tax agents and on all communications to the Board and the A TO. The SARS proposal 
lacks this detail and does not state what will happen once a tax practitioner is granted 
membership of the Association. A similar approach to registration as adopted by the 
ATAB could be utilised in South Africa. The problem, however, with adopting this 
approach is that everyone will be issued with the same certificate of registration, resulting 
in no differentiation between members. A concern was expressed by a member of 
SAICA in the SAICA discussion forum held earlier in 2005, that if the same certificate is 
issued to all members irrespective of their qualification levels then a chartered accountant 
will be viewed in the same manner as a practitioner with a diploma. It was feared that the 
"CA" brand would suffer, as all tax practitioners would be seen to be the same in the eyes 
of the public. In order to address this issue, differentiation of categories of tax 
practitioners should be investigated for implementation in South Africa. This aspect is 
explored in further detail in the next chapter. 
In order to be admitted as a tax agent in Australia certain prescribed qualifications in 
terms of the Income Tax Regulation No. 156 have to be met. A person may be admitted 
as a tax agent in the following cases: if he or she has a tertiary qualification in 
accountancy plus experience, if the person is either a barrister or solicitor, if he or she has 
studied in accountancy at a technical and further education college (TAFE) or, lastly, if 
the person has had a minimum of eight years relevant employment experience. Each 
category contains various requirements. If the person falls into the first category 
according to SARS (2002b: 5 to 6) he or she: 
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(a) shall have completed the academic requirements for the award of a degree, 
diploma or other qualification from an Australian university, college of 
advanced education or other tertiary institution of an equivalent standard, and 
have passed examinations in such subj ects ... to represent a course of study in 
accountancy of not less than 3 years' duration and in commercial law of not 
less than 18 months' duration or shall possess such other qualifications as the 
Board regards as equivalent to those qualifications; 
(b) shall have: 
(i) been engaged in relevant employment on a full-time basis for not 
less than a total of 12 months in the preceding 5 years; 
(ii) otherwise be engaged in relevant employment to an extent that the 
Board regards as equivalent to that referred to in (i) above; or 
(iii) been engaged in such other employment and for such time as the 
Board regards as equivalent to being engaged in relevant 
employment as referred to in (i) above, and 
(c) shall have, by written examination, successfully completed a course of study 
in Australian income tax acceptable to the Board. 
These requirements need to be fulfilled in order for a person to be admitted as a tax agent. 
In this instance the person will have the relevant qualification requirement plus 
expenence. 
Secondly, if an individual is a barrister or solicitor he or she will be admissible as a tax 
agent according to SARS (2002b:6) if such person: 
(a) shall have completed the academic requirements for admission as a 
barrister or solicitor of the High Court or of the Supreme Court of a Sate 
or Territory; 
(b) shall have : 
(i) been engaged in relevant employment on a full-time basis for not 
less than a total of 12 months in the preceding 5 years; 
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(ii) otherwise be engaged in relevant employment to an extent that the 
Board regards as equivalent to that referred to in (i) above; or 
(iii) been engaged in such other employment and for such time as the 
Board regards as equivalent to being engaged in relevant 
employment as referred to in (i) above; 
(c) shall have, by written examination or examinations set by a college of 
technical and further education (or an examination or examinations of an 
equivalent or higher standard), successfully completed a course of study in 
basic accounting principles; and 
(d) shall have, by written examination, successfully completed a course of 
study in Australian income tax law acceptable to the Board. 
A third type of individual who can be admitted as a tax agent is a person who has 
obtained a qualification in accountancy at a college of technical and further education. 
SARS (2002b:6) states that admission will be granted if such person: 
(a) shall have completed the academic requirements for the award of a 
diploma or certificate from a college of technical and further education 
(T AFE) following a course of study in accountancy of not less than 2 
years' duration of full-time study or 4 years' duration of part-time study; 
(b) shall have: 
(i) been engaged in relevant employment on a full-time basis for not 
less than a total of 2 years in the preceding 5 years; 
(ii) otherwise be engaged in relevant employment to an extent that the 
Board regards as equivalent to that referred to in (i) above; or 
(iv) been engaged in such other employment and for such time as the 
Board regards as equivalent to being engaged in relevant 
employment as referred to in (i) above; and 
(c) shall have, by written examination, successfully completed a course of 
study in Australian income tax law acceptable to the Board. 
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The [mal category in which a member can be admitted as a tax agent is if he or she has a 
minimum of eight years of relevant employment. SARS (2002b:7) states that such a 
person: 
(a) shall have: 
(i) been engaged in relevant employment on a full-time basis for not 
less that a total of 8 years in the preceding 10 years; 
(ii) otherwise be engaged in relevant employment to an extent that the 
Board regards as equivalent to that referred to in (i) above; or 
(iii) been engaged in such other employment and for such time as the 
Board regards as equivalent to being engaged in relevant 
employment as referred to in (i) above; and 
(b) shall: 
(i) be a member of and entitled to vote at meetings of the Australian 
Society of Accountants, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia or the National Institute of Accountants; or 
(ii) have, by written examination or examinations set by a college of 
technical or further education (or an examination or examinations 
of an equivalent or higher standard), successfully completed a 
course of study in basic accountancy principles and have, by 
written examination, successfully completed a course of study in 
Australian income tax law acceptable to the Board. 
In all four categories it is required that a person has "by written examination, successfully 
completed a course of study in Australian income tax law acceptable to the Tax Agent's 
Board" (SARS 2002b:7). Various degrees of experience and accounting competency are 
other requirements. With regards to experience requirements according to SARS 
(2002b:7) the term relevant employment means "employment by a person in the course 
of which there has been substantial involvement in income tax matters including: 
• the preparation or examination of a broad range of income tax returns; 
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• the preparation or examination of objections to assessments issued in respect 
of such returns; and 
• the provision of advice in relation to income tax returns, assessments or 
objections. 
The above examples are by no means exhaustive and it will be at the discretion of the 
ATAB whether a candidate wishing to be admitted as a tax agent will have sufficient 
relevant experience. 
Although there are different admission criteria for a tax agent in Australia, this does not 
mean that once registered, a tax agent with a qualification in accountancy from a TAFE 
will be viewed any differently to a tax agent who is a barrister or solicitor. The AT AB 
makes no distinction between highly qualified members and those with a technikon 
diploma. Similarly the certificate of registration will not display this distinction. 
Although the SARS discussion document may have based its two-tiered membership 
approach on that which the ATAB adopts, South Africa might need to adopt a slightly 
different approach in order to gain the acceptance of the majority of tax practitioners of 
the impending tax regulation. 
The current South African proposal and that of the AT AB tends to group members into 
one body, with all members being given one identity, for example, tax agent. According 
to Arendse (2005:6) "the academic standard and professional requirements of Chartered 
Accountants is higher than any other professional accountancy body in South Africa and 
it is essential that this accomplishment is not diminished in any way through the 
regulation process". In order to recognise this SAICA members could be either given an 
accredited membership or, alternatively, tiered membership could be adopted. 
Admission to each tier would be dependant "upon the academic qualification, experience 
and professional level of the member" (Arendse, 2005:6). Chartered Accountants would 
therefore be admitted to the highest membership tier. As stated above, this area of 
concern is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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In Australia, if a person charges a fee for the execution of tax servICes whilst not 
registered as a tax agent, he or she will be committing an offence. According to SARS 
(2002b:5) this person will "face a fine, upon conviction, of up to 200 penalty units 
($22,000) ... It is also an offence, under section 2510 of the IT AA36, to represent 
oneself as a tax agent or to advertise that tax returns can be prepared and to attend to 
income tax matters unless registered as a tax agent. The penalty for breaching section 
2510 is a maximum fme of 10 penalty units ($1,100)" (SARS, 2002b:5). This could be 
an additional point for SARS to consider including in the legislation governing the 
Association if it wishes to increase public protection and create and uphold a good name 
for the tax profession. 
Fit and proper person 
In order for a tax practitioner to be registered as a tax agent in Australia an essential 
condition "is the notion of being a 'fit and proper person' to prepare income tax returns 
and transact business on behalf of taxpayers in income tax matters" (AT AB 2005c: 1). 
This is an explicit condition contained in the Australian law governing the ATAB and is a 
decisive factor when admitting an individual as a tax agent. The Board is entitled not to 
register a person if they are do not meet the criteria of being a "fit and proper person" and 
similarly, once registered, the Board could suspend or cancel the registration of a tax 
agent if the above requirement is not satisfied. There is, however, not an absolute 
definition of the expression "fit and proper person". In the High Court Case of Hughes 
and Vale (Pty) Ltd v The State of NSW [No.2} (1955) 93 CLR 127 at 156 (ATAB, 
2005a: 1 to 2) the court made reference to the expression "fit and proper person" as being: 
familiar enough as traditional words when used with reference to offices and 
perhaps vocations. But their very purpose is to give the widest scope for 
judgment and indeed for rejection. "Fit" (or "ideoneus") with respect to an office 
is said to involve three things, honesty, knowledge and ability: honesty to execute 
it truly, without malice, affection or partiality; knowledge to know what he ought 
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duly to do; and ability as well in estate as in body, that he may intend and execute 
his office, when need is, diligently, and not for impotency or poverty neglect it. 
The values of "honesty, knowledge and ability" seem to be the key factors in determining 
whether an individual is a fit and proper person. These values, according to the ATAB 
(2005a:3), "can be referred to as the general umbrellas of 'capacity', 'qualifications ' and 
'good fame integrity and character"'. In terms of the first umbrella being that of 
capacity, a person will not be deemed to be "fit and proper" if he or she is not a natural 
person or has not attained the age of eighteen years. Under the second umbrella a person 
will not be deemed to be "fit and proper" if he or she has not met the qualification criteria 
as discussed in the paragraphs above. Thirdly if the person does not express good fame, 
integrity and character he or she will not be admitted as a tax agent. 
In the case of Re Su and Tax Agents' Board, SA (1982) 82 ATe 4284 and 4286 (ATAB, 
2005c: 12 to 13) some indication was provided as to what "the general notion of 'good 
fame, integrity and character' in the Act entails by referring to the functions of a tax 
agent: 
The function of a tax agent is to prepare and lodge income tax returns for other 
persons. A person is a fit and proper person to handle the affairs of a client if he 
is a person of good reputation, has proper knowledge or taxation laws, is able to 
deal competently with any queries which may be raised by officers of the 
Taxation Department. He should be a person of such competence and integrity 
that others may entrust their taxation affairs to his care. He should be a person of 
such reputation and ability that officers of the Taxation Department may proceed 
upon the footing that the taxation returns lodged by the agent have been prepared 
by him honesty and competently. 
If the Board frods against any of the above the applicant may be deemed not to be a "fit 
and proper person" and not admitted as a tax agent. The SARS proposal, (2002b: 8), 
states two instances of conduct that will affect fame and character: 
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(a) the person has been convicted of a senous taxation offence during the 
previous five years, or 
(b) the person is under sentence or imprisonment for a serious taxation offence. 
A "serious taxation offence" has been defined in Division 1, section 251 A of Part VIIA 
of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as being: 
(a) an offence against section 29D or 86A of the Crimes Act 1914, being an 
offence that relates to a tax liability within the meaning of the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953; or 
(b) an offence that relates to an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a); 
or 
(c) an offence that is: 
(i) an offence against a taxation law; or 
(ii) an offence against sections 6, 7 or 7A of the Crimes Act 1914, or 
subsection 86(1) of that Act by virtue of (a) of that subsection, 
being an offence that relates to an offence against a taxation law. 
Any applicant or member convicted of a serious taxation offence will not be allowed to 
practise as a tax agent as it will not constitute "good fame, integrity and character". 
It can be established from the previous paragraphs that the AT AB has a set system in 
place in determining whether an individual will qualify to be registered as a tax agent and 
when he or she would be disqualified. Certain requirements are set out in the Act and are 
administered by the Board when applications are received. These qualification and 
disqualification criteria are lacking in the SARS proposal. The proposal simply provides 
qualification requirements and experience criteria that will enable a practitioner to 
become a registered member. At no stage in the proposal are other qualification criteria 
mentioned, such as the character of the person. In addition, disqualification criteria are 
not addressed at all. The only reference of disqualification contained in the proposal 
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relates to cancellation of membership when the tax practitioner has already been 
registered. According to SARS (2002b:22): 
(a) the Board shall cancel the membership of any member who subsequent to 
his or her admission to membership is: 
(i) removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct; or 
(ii) convicted of theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document or 
peIjury and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment. . . 
More stringent admission requirements, similar to those adopted by the AT AB, need to 
be addressed by SARS in preparation for the impending creation of the Association. The 
necessity of this was expressed by the AT AB (200Sc: 19): 
the importance of establishing conditions for membership with a profession is that 
it provides the opportunity for the profession to manifest their commitment to 
ensuring public protection. It suggests that those who have been recognised as a 
member of the profession have met the high standards that it requires to sustain 
their position of privilege and, in addition, that their continued affiliation is 
contingent upon them maintaining those standards. 
Public protection has been expressed as one key element or purpose for the proposed 
creation of the Association in South Africa. Therefore, to ensure that this objective is 
achieved, stringent admission requirements have to be enforced and maintained. This 
will make the public more confident in its use of tax practitioners registered with this 
organisation. 
General responsibilities and conduct of tax agents 
According to the ATAB (200Sb:!), once registered as a tax agent the agent has the right 
to "charge a fee to prepare income tax returns and objections and to transact business on 
67 
behalf of taxpayers in income tax matters; it also carries a number of responsibilities". 
Most importantly, as expressed in the AT AB (2005b: 1) a tax practitioner is expected to: 
I . Prepare returns honestly and competently, so that they are true and accurate; 
2. Keep up to date with changes in taxation laws and practice; 
3. Act professionally in dealing with clients, including the Australian Taxation 
Office; and 
4. Maintain your good fame and character. Your reputation for honesty and 
integrity is one of your major assets as a tax agent. 
The ATAB does not have a specific code of conduct within its organisation to which tax 
agents have to adhere. "Generally, the Board accepts behavior and practice consistent 
with the various "Codes of Professional Conduct" of the accounting and legal 
professional associations, as satisfying these requirements" (ATAB, 2005b:I). The tax 
agent cannot plead ignorance that he or she is not aware of the requirements of the code 
of conduct applicable to these professions as it is stipulated in the documentation dealing 
with responsibilities, that if an agent is at any time uncertain of correct practice, that he or 
she should contact the AT AB for advice. This approach differs somewhat from the 
SARS proposal which states that the Association will have its own code of professional 
conduct, on establishment. The creation of this code of conduct will necessitate a large 
investment of time and money and again could be an area of duplication of effort as both 
legal and accounting professions in South Africa currently have established codes of 
conduct. 
Complaints 
As mentioned above one of the duties of the Board is to deal with complaints received by 
the public relating to tax agents. Taxpayers have a right to lodge a complaint if they are 
not satisfied with the performance or conduct of the tax agent. The complaints will be 
addressed in terms of a "dispute resolution" (ATAB, 2005a:2) in order to ascertain 
whether a tax agent is "fit to remain registered or whether ... registration should be 
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suspended or cancelled" (ATAB, 2005a:2). ATAB (2005a:6) states that "the Board can 
deal with complaints which are directly related to tax agent services such as preparing tax 
returns and objections, and matters that reflect on an agent's character, integrity and 
general fitness to be registered as a tax agent". It further states that the Board can 
consider complaints such as: 
• negotiating your refund without your authority; 
• failing to forward on your refund in a timely manner; 
• refusing to release your documents without a lawful reason; 
• misconduct, such as falsifying your tax return; 
• lodging your return without your authority; 
• neglecting your tax affairs; 
• continually lodging returns late; 
• failing to pass on correspondence; 
• continually failing to respond to phone calls or letters; and 
• negligent, criminal or fraudulent conduct. 
If a tax agent is not registered the Board will not take action on these complaints, but will 
refer them to the Tax Agent Investigation Unit of the ATO. This office will then conduct 
the investigation. In addition, any dispute that has arisen over fees cannot be resolved by 
the Board as this is considered to be a matter between the taxpayer and tax agent and of a 
more commercial nature. Complaints against a tax agent must be lodged in writing and 
the tax agent will then have an opportunity to respond to the complaint. After 
considering the complaint and on conclusion of the investigation the Board may "caution, 
suspend or cancel the registration of the tax agent" (ATAB, 2005a:7). 
The complaints procedure is very detailed in the documentation of the AT AB. It 
provides both the tax agent and taxpayer with guidance on what kind of conduct would 
constitute grounds for a complaint, how to lodge a complaint, what the procedure would 
be on receipt of a complaint and what consequences the tax agent could face on the 
outcome of the investigation. The SARS proposal does not list the administration of 
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complaints as one of its objectives. Administration of complaints and the process in 
which to deal with these is a key aspect of tax practitioner regulation. It creates greater 
public confidence in the process in that the public will have an avenue in which to 
address complaints if they are not satisfied with the performance of their tax practitioners. 
In addition tax practitioners will be aware of the grounds on which complaints may be 
lodged and the process to be followed thereafter. The SARS proposal makes reference to 
many punishable offences but provides no detail on how these offences will be 
discovered or monitored by the Association or dealt with on discovery. With public 
protection being one of the main aims for the formation of the Association, this area 
needs to be further addressed by SARS before the finalisation of the regulations or 
legislation constituting the Association. 
Conclusion 
The code of conduct and regulations of the AT AB are focused very strongly on 
protecting the reputation and standing of the profession. It has strict rules of conduct in 
place to ensure that high standards are maintained and that the public is, above all, 
protected to ensure the good name of the profession is upheld. If a tax professional 
becomes a member of the AT AB it will mean that he or she has met the strict standards 
and the public will view this as such. This Board has worked effectively since its 
establishment and, with continuous improvement over the years, has managed to continue 
to uphold its high standards. 
The model of the ATAB contains many attributes upon which SARS could base its 
regulatory system. The ATAB has clearly defined roles and objectives of the Board 
which are focused on achieving regulation and stringent admission requirements. The 
notion of a "fit and proper person" is adopted by the AT AB as one of its stringent 
admission requirements, which helps to identify those persons who qualify for admission 
as a tax agent and those who are disqualified. These criteria are lacking in the SARS 
proposal. 
stipulated. 
In addition, the general responsibilities and conduct of tax agents are 
One interesting aspect which SARS could consider is that the AT AB does not 
70 
have its own code of conduct, but merely stipulates that members should adhere to the 
codes of conduct maintained by the accounting and legal professional associations. This 
reduces operating costs significantly. There are also clear procedures outlined for the 
administration of complaints, which is another grey area in the SARS proposal. A 
similarity between the two proposals is that neither provides a distinction between 
members once registered, therefore a chartered accountant is viewed as equivalent to a 
lawyer or the holder of a matriculation certificate. This area has raised concerns, as 
discussed in chapter 3, and will be reviewed again in the final chapter. 
After evaluating the SARS proposal and two existing models, namely the EAAB and the 
ATAB, the next chapter evaluates the three models against the proposed conceptual 
regulatory framework. This will assist in identifying the most appropriate model which 
fulfills all the requirements of the framework and on which SARS could base its 
proposal. In addition, the chapter will put forward various opinions and comments, 
highlighting possible further research areas or areas of consideration for SARS. 
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CHAPTER 6 - EVALUATION OF THE THREE REGULATORY MODELS 
AGAINST THE BASIC REGULA TORY FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters the SARS proposal, dealing with the regulation of tax 
practitioners in South Africa, was reviewed in detail and two alternative regulatory 
models, those of the Estate Agents' Board and the Australian Tax Agents ' Board, were 
evaluated and compared with the SARS proposal. Each model was critically evaluated 
and this revealed various advantages and disadvantages of each of the models. These 
comparisons also helped to identify flaws or gaps in the SARS proposal. In addition, a 
conceptual regulatory framework was proposed in chapter 3, against which the various 
regulatory models could be evaluated. 
In this chapter the proposed regulatory framework is used to evaluate the three regulatory 
models addressed in the research, namely the SARS proposal, the EAAB and the ATAB. 
Each model is evaluated against the best practice aspects of the regulatory framework and 
conclusions are reached on their adherence to each of these best practices. In addition, 
concerns are highlighted, where flaws and gaps are identified. This chapter also identifies 
areas of possible future research. 
Comparison of the various regulatory provisions for tax practitioners 
Refer to the spreadsheet on the page that follows. 
72 
COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS REGULATORY PROVISIONS FOR TAX PRACTITIONERS 
BEST PRACTICE ASPECTS (BASED ON TIm SARS PROPOSED ASSOCIATION OP 
TIm REGULATION FRAMEWORK) TAX PRACITI'IONERS TIm ESTATE AGENTS' BOARD AUSTRALIAN TAX AGENTS' BOARD 
-
Degree of State control - Independent of the South African Revenue - Act of Parliament - Statutory - Provisions incorporated in the Income 
--
Services Regulation Tax Assessment Act 
, - A self-regulated legal persona - Members of fu. Board appointed - Board in each State: independent 
i 
- One representative of SARS and National by fue Mfuiater (of Trade and Industxy) statutory bodies acting autonomously 
, 
Treasury on fue Board - No govemmentrepresentation . - One tax office member on each Board 
- Commissioner afTaxation has no 
control over Board proceedings 
. VISion, Mission, Strategic Objectives 
- Protection oft ill: tax base - Maintain and promote standards of - Protecting fue public by ensuring 
- Protection of the taxpaying public conduct that persons who charge a fee for 
- Regulate activities of estate agents providing taxation-related services 
[No vision or mission articulated] (to protect fuc public) have appropriate knowledge and are 
fit and proper persons 10 be registered 
[Vlsion and mission articulated] as tax agents 
Ngte2 
[No vision or mission articulated] 
Goals, or detailed strategic objectives: - Promote fue common interest of tax - Preventing unsuitable persons from No specific goals are stated, but fue 
practitioners entering fu. industly BoamrespoDSl'bilities arc set out 
- Establish rules ofbebaviour - Maintain and preserve fue tax integrity and - Administering a qualifying examination 
- Monitor, supervise. enforce status of fue profession for new applicants - Administering tax agent registration 
- Advance fue fueory and practice of -Investigating complaints relating to requirements 
taxation in all respects improper conduct and activity of - Determining suitability of applicants 
- Provide for research into taxation members to be registered 
- Provide members with infonnation on - Imposing c1isciplinary sanction for - Dealing wifu complaints about tax 
developments violations of fue Licenaing Act or code agents 
- Speak wifu one voice of conduct - Ensuring fue maintenanc.e of proper 
- Allowmcmbers to exchange views - Reimbursing consumers who baye standards across the tax agent 
- Provide courses, seminars and suffered financiallo," furougb theft profej!sion 
presentations to oilier professions and fue by estate agents of trust money (from 
public fue Fidelity Fund) 
- Co-operate at all times wifu SARS and 
fue National Treasury Twelve further fimctionsare listed 
- Pass comment on actual and imvending . including administration, image building, 
legislation training and information services, 
- Prescribe qualifications and/or experience ensuring competence and moral fitness, . 
to be obtained by members compliance with standards and 
-Apply for membership and co-operate redressing past imbalances. 
with national and intcmational bodies . 
-
Notes relating to the comparative grid 
Note 1: State involvement 
State involvement in the Estate Agents' Affairs Board (EAAB) is very clear, while the Australian 
Tax Agents' Board (ATAB) is an independent body. The Association of Tax Practitioners (the 
Association) is proposed as an independent, self-regulated legal persona. What is not clear is 
how the Association will be constituted: a separate Act or provisions within the Income Tax Act? 
Note 2: Strategic objectives 
Both the EAAB and the ATAB have one over-riding objective - protection of the public when 
they make use of the services of members. The Association has two proposed objectives -
protection of the taxpaying public and protection of the tax base. 
Note 3: Goals aimed at achieving the objectives 
The goals (or strategic objectives) ofthe EAAB and the ATAB are formulated in accordance with 
the theoretical Regulation Framework proposed in the research. The goals of the Association 
include only two which are in accordance with the Regulation Framework: prescribing 
qualifications for admission of members and dispute settlements. The others are loosely 
formulated goals and functions (further discussion to follow). 
Note 4: Constitution and composition of the Board 
The method of constituting the Association has not been proposed in the SARS document, or its 
composition. 
Note 5: Matters relating to improper conduct 
The SARS proposal for the Association is not clearly set out and is lacking in certain respects. 
Note 6: Membership and admission requirements 
The SARS proposal provides for a two-tier structure of membership, based on the complexity of 
the tax work to be performed, as well as the academic and experiential qualifications for each tier. 
There is no clarity on certification or licensing. Further concerns are addressed later. 
Note 7: Funding 
No provision is made in relation to funding of the Association. Further concerns are addressed 
later. 
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List of concerns flowing from the comparison and the prior review of the SARS 
proposal 
In addition to the matters referred to in the notes appended to the table, the following 
concerns arise from the SARS proposal for the Association: 
• The function of section 67 A of the Income Tax Act 
If the Association is to operate as a separate body, will the members register with this 
body and, ifso, what function will section 67A of the Act fulfil? Is it intended as an 
interim measure, or will the entire constitution of the Association and the registration 
of members be effected through the Income Tax Act? 
• Objectives of the Association 
The dual objectives proposed for the Association by SARS are not in line with the 
other two Boards and the objective of protecting the tax base may not be appropriate. 
In the opinion of the writer, this could lead to a conflict of interest for registered 
members. One over-riding objective should be formulated and the writer is of the 
opinion that the protection of the public should be the main objective, bringing the 
SARS proposal into line with that of the EAAB and the ATAB. 
This main objective could easily be achieved through ancillary objectives such as 
setting up and maintaining a code of conduct, a complaints and disciplinary procedure 
for non-adhering members and severe penalties for individuals who are found to be 
practising tax who are not members of the Association. The AT AB has clear, 
defining objectives in order to achieve its main objective. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter the responsibilities or objectives of the ATAB are "to administer 
the tax agent registration requirements" and to be "responsible for determining the 
suitability of applicants to be registered as tax agents, dealing with complaints about 
tax agents and ensuring that proper standards are maintained across the tax agent 
profession" ATAB (2005a:I). These are the responsibilities or objectives to which 
SARS should align the regulation of the tax industry in South Africa. There are four 
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main focus areas, the fIrst being registration of applicants through various admission 
requirements, second and third being the handling complaints by reviewing these and 
initiating disciplinary action where necessary and the fmal one being to ensure that 
standards are always maintained through continued professional development or 
alternative assessment criteria. By simply having these four key objectives public 
protection is achieved, as all tax professionals will belong to one body and be 
regulated by the same rules and regulations, meaning therefore that if a professional 
belongs to the Association he or she has met the high standard of the Association and 
the public can be confIdent when using his or her services. 
In addition to the conflict of interest that could arise from the second objective, this 
conflict of interest flows through to the proposed goals of the Association and the 
objective to "co-operate at all times with SARS and National Treasury". This would 
also prompt the question whether the representation of SARS and the National 
Treasury on the Board is intended to facilitate such co-operation. According to de 
Klerk (2003:24) practitioners must not be "seen to be an extension of SARS, nor 
should it be an organisation that should be doing the work of SARS. There is an 
inherent danger of this happening if SARS is a stakeholder". Consultation with 
SARS to ensure "good tax practice as well as assisting in voluntary compliance and 
the curtailment of errors" (de Klerk, 2003:24), would be benefIcial to the Association. 
Overstepping this boundary would be detrimental. According to Arendse (2005:5) "if 
the intention behind the regulation is to protect the public interest, then it is 
inappropriate for the regulation to be carried out by SARS, as this approach would 
reduce the regulatory Board to no more than another tax-collection arm." If the 
Association is seen by the public as an extension of SARS or to be lacking in 
independence, this could become "a major disincentive to use tax practitioners" 
(Arendse, 2005:5) regulated by the Association. 
The writer agrees with these views and therefore proposes that the committee should 
consist of people with tax knowledge and additionally having business and fmancial 
expertise. It should be constituted from representatives of existing professional 
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bodies, the number of representatives could be aligned to that of the AT AB or an 
alternative number if needed. Representation could be according to the "South 
African based practicing members represented by each body" (de Klerk, 2003:24). 
The Board must also be completely autonomous and independent of SARS. 
• Other objectives 
Included amongst the detailed strategic objectives, the objectives to advance the 
theory and practice of taxation in all respects, to provide courses, seminars and 
presentations to other professions and the public and to pass comment on actual and 
impending legislation, implies the existence of a large organisational structure and 
high costs for members, which would have to be passed through by way of fees 
charged to taxpayers seeking advice. In order to ensure that '1ust another toothless 
watchdog" (Arendse, 2005:4) will not be created, SARS has to carefully streamline 
the proposed objectives of the Association. 
• Applicability to all practitioners 
A point that has been highlighted in a preceding chapter is that the regulation must 
apply to all tax practitioners and not only to a certain group. "Any person completing 
a tax return on behalf of another should be regulated, not only those who do so for 
reward, as rewards may be in various forms which may not easily be detected, for 
example, weekends away" (Arendse, 2005:3). 
• Membership of other professional bodies 
A concern that has been expressed in relation to membership of the Association is the 
overlap with members of other professional bodies who would be required to register 
with the Association. Increased costs, duplication of codes of conduct (and possibly 
conflicts) and duplication of training, seminars and commentary on legislation give 
rise to further concerns relating to cost. SAICA and other accounting professions 
have supported the proposed regulation, but have made it quite clear that "the 
establishment of a separate regulatory body for tax practitioners would be a 
duplication of effort where practitioners are already regulated" (Arendse, 2005:3). 
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Therefore, whilst SAICA has accepted the need for regulation, particularly with 
reference to those taxpayers currently not belonging to a professional body, it is of the 
opinion that "any regulation that is introduced should recognise that SAICA members 
are already regulated, and as far as possible, the existing regulatory structures should 
be used" (Arendse, 2005:3). SAICA is of the opinion that "it may be appropriate to 
have 'accredited members', which would refer to tax practitioners who are members 
of an approved professional body, such as SAICA members, and 'general members', 
being those who do not belong to an approved professional body. All members must 
be required to adhere to the minimum requirements of the regulatory Board" 
(Arendse, 2005:5). The writer has recommended exemptions for certain professions 
or affiliated membership. 
• Rules of conduct and penalties 
Rules of conduct and penalties are prescribed by existing professional bodies and the 
Income Tax Act also provides for a number of offences and penalties, including 
sections 69, 72, 73, 75 and 75A of the Act. The SARS discussion document did 
express reservations if reliance were to be placed on the existing codes of conduct 
upheld by various professional bodies, on the basis that "the existing codes of conduct 
are normally not tax specific" (SARS, 2002b:2). SAICA countered this by stating 
that "this problem could be relatively easily overcome as the professional bodies can 
adapt their codes of conduct to ensure that they meet certain minimum criteria" 
(Arendse, 2005:4). In addition the Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(CPA) stated that, if necessary, existing codes of conduct "could be easily amplified" 
(de Klerk, 2003 :21), in order to achieve SARS requirements. The suggestion put 
forward by SAICA was that the "Regulatory Board establish its own code of 
professional conduct and disciplinary procedures and other professional bodies be 
allowed a period of time in which to amend their Codes and procedures to meet the 
same criteria with regard to tax specific requirements" (Arendse, 2005:4). Once the 
alignment has taken place these codes of professional conduct should then be 
recognised by the Association. "The members of those professional bodies should 
then be regulated by their own professional bodies and the regulatory Board should 
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then rely on their Codes, and disciplinary processes" (Arendse, 2005:4). This 
approach is similar to that followed by the AT AB in Australia and would help to 
minimise the duplication of effort and cost to those members already belonging to 
existing professional bodies. Professional bodies that have an established code of 
conduct such as SAICA and CPA have, in addition, disciplinary processes. If the 
code of professional conduct becomes aligned to the minimum requirements expected 
by the Association, then a similar process would need to occur with regard to 
disciplinary procedures. Once this alignment has taken place professional bodies will 
be responsible for disciplining their own members and this would help to avoid 
duplication of effort. 
The CPA was of the opinion that if instances, which require disciplinary action, are 
going to mirror the twenty punishable offences as listed in the SARS proposal, that 
this could be excessive. In their submission to SARS they stated that punishable 
offences contained in "paragraphs (b) - (t) go way beyond the reasonable norms for 
the regulation of practitioners in that it is specifically referenced to the advantage of 
SARS and does not relate to professional conduct in general. It has all the trappings 
of a club to be placed in the hands of SARS, with a view towards keeping the 
organized professions in tune to its music" (de Klerk, 2003:22). The CPA further 
emphasised that if "paragraphs (b) - (t) be enforced, it should be made to apply to 
members in limited practice, full practice and senior employees of SARS. A 
Committee of Tax Experts should discuss the details of these offences" (de Klerk, 
2003:22). The CPA strongly expresses the point that the list of punishable offences is 
too lengthy and difficult to monitor, investigate and prove. It also concurs with 
SAICA in that professional bodies already have disciplinary procedures and that if 
there was any failure to take appropriate action, "it would stand to be challenged by 
SARS for dereliction of duty" (de Klerk, 2003:22). The writer is in agreement with 
the proposal made by both SAICA and the CPA regarding the code of conduct and 
disciplinary action. In addition, the Association could follow the method adopted by 
the AT AB where members are required to adhere to the codes of conduct of the legal 
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and accounting professions and therefore the regulatory authority would not have to 
set up its own code of conduct. 
• Improper conduct 
A further area lacking in the SARS proposal is the punishment of improper conduct. 
The proposal lists many punishable offences but does not detail what form of 
punishment will be imposed once the offence has been committed. The regulations 
will serve no purpose if no punishments are enforced, as exploitation wilI continue if 
appropriate disincentives are not implemented. A suitable punishment therefore 
needs to be introduced to act as a disincentive. "For example, the Australian model 
should be folIowed which imposes a substantial fme on any person completing tax 
returns who is not a registered tax agent" (Arendse, 2005:5). The Board of the 
Association will therefore need to decide on the various fmes or penalties that will be 
implemented when an offence is committed. Various degrees of punishment should 
fit the type of offence committed. One additional point to consider according to 
Arendse (2005:5) is "to prevent 'moonlighting practitioners' from exploiting other 
practitioners' regulation status". 
• Categories of membership 
The granting of membership is another area of concern. The SARS proposal referred 
to different categories of membership using a tiered approach, setting out stringent 
admission requirements based on qualifications and experience. It can be agreed that 
there is a definite need for different categories of membership as certain tax 
practitioners perform tax compliance work only, whereas "other persons are engaged 
solely in rendering opinions or advice on the fiscal statutes of South Africa" 
(Dijkman, 2003:5). These two categories will result in the academic and experience 
requirements being different. Although different levels are necessary, the proposed 
minimum requirements that need to be satisfied before admission to anyone of the 
levels are stringent. 
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A particular area of concern is the number of tax hours a practitioner is required to 
have completed before entrance to a particular level is granted. According to 
Dijkman (2003: 5) "many practitioners, although handling much tax work, do not do 
so exclusively as they also provide other professional services. This could create a 
problem in reaching the number of hours proposed by the regulations". It can also 
not be taken for granted that a person who works longer hours in the field of tax is 
more competent that another person working fewer hours. "Providing proof of the 
number of hours worked is also problematical, as it would appear that few 
professionals document the number of hours spent on a particular area of work" 
(Dijkman, 2003:5 to 6). It is also not clear how a person who has been working 
outside the tax field would gain the necessary experience, as a person cannot act as 
a tax practitioner unless they have the necessary experience and cannot obtain the 
necessary experience as they will not be allowed to practise tax. The only solution 
in this instance would be for a person to join a tax consulting firm and work under 
the guidance of a partner registered as a tax practitioner and obtain the necessary 
hours of experience. It is not clear, however, if this is acceptable to SARS. 
An additional requirement that has to be met in order to become a full member is 
that an applicant needs to possess a post-graduate degree in the field of tax. This 
may affect many older practitioners who have not obtained this form of 
qualification but, through the years of experience gained, are extremely competent. 
These practitioners may also find it difficult to prove the number of hours of 
experience obtained due to insufficient documentation of this over the past number 
of years. "It is also doubtful whether members of the legal profession will have the 
required two courses in accounting notwithstanding the fact that they may have a 
post-graduate qualification in tax" (Dijkman, 2003:6). The types of applicants 
mentioned above could be refused membership based on their lack of qualifications 
or hours of experience. "As it stands at present it would appear as if a vast number 
of tax practitioners would not meet the stringent academic requirements set by 
SARS to qualify for inclusion into the full practicing group. This notwithstanding 
the fact that they may have a high level of functional ability and tax knowledge" 
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(de Klerk, 2003: 18). In a submission made to SARS by the CPA it was stated that 
"there is no need for the stringent academic and experience requirements for full 
practicing membership. The fact that anyone has a qualification and passed all the 
relevant academic courses laid down in the proposal as well as having the correct 
amount of South African tax work experience is not a guarantee that the person has 
kept up to date with changes in taxation legislation and is therefore qualified for 
full practicing membership" (de Klerk, 2003:20). Full membership should be 
allowed with respect to "current set requirements with regards to qualifications, 
experience and Continued Professional Development (CPD) requirements" (de 
Klerk, 2003:20) of accredited professional bodies. SARS therefore needs to 
reconsider the admission requirements for full membership and take into account 
long-practising members or members of the legal profession who may not have all 
the necessary university or technikon courses as required. 
Another form of membership contained in the SARS proposal is for members who 
are entitled to limited practice. These members "are confined to the year or period 
covered by the return that he or she prepared" (Dijkman 2003:7). This may not be 
practical in all instances. The fact that they "can only represent the taxpayer 
concerning the year or period covered by the return that he prepared together with 
the fact that the member cannot represent a taxpayer on appeal, will have the effect 
of increasing costs to the taxpayer, since additional professionals will have to be 
contracted in" (de Klerk, 2003: 17). In addition, in an instance where the taxpayer 
changes advisors and receives a query relating to a return submitted by the previous 
advisor, "the new advisor would appear to be precluded from dealing with any 
matter relating to the prior return lodged by the previous advisor" (Dijkman, 
2003:7). This could place the taxpayer in a difficult and costly situation, as 
members entitled to full practice may have to be contracted in. De Klerk (2003:18) 
further states in the submission of the CPA that "members entitled to limited 
practice will not be allowed to function as public officers (neither as tax 
practitioners in general) to Close Corporations. They will no longer be able to 
render a 'one stop' tax and accounting service to Close Corporations because of the 
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splitting of their functions as 'accounting officer' and their functioning as 'public 
officer'. Serving only low-income earners will impoverish their practices and can 
lead to bankruptcy in many instances". 
The solution proposed by SARS to deal with the concerns mentioned above is 
membership "structured along the complexity of taxpayers" (Dijkman, 2003: 17). 
Dijkman (2003: 17) provides an example of "taxpayers who are employees or 
pensioners and do not carry on any other trade, taxpayers who earn remuneration or 
passive income from investment regardless of whether these taxpayers are 
provisional taxpayers or not, could be serviced by members entitled to limited 
practice. This would be regardless of whether such member prepared the tax return 
or not". The submission by the CPA expresses a somewhat different opinion, as it 
is stated in the submission that members entitled to limited practice "should be 
regarded as an entry level only and a time limit should be set for practitioners to 
progress to full practice. After a window period only members entitled to full 
practice should be allowed to operate" (de Klerk, 2003:19). The CPA is also of the 
opinion that "anyone completing tax returns for reward ... should have passed at 
least one entry exam at an accredited controlling body ... An entry exam will allow 
people with the necessary skills but not necessarily the required qualification for 
full practicing membership to become full practicing members" (de Klerk, 
2003:19). The suggestion is that SARS "develop a learnership program that is 
registered with the Seta for Finance, Accounting, Management Consulting and 
other Financial Services (FASSET) to enable tax practitioners to train future tax 
practitioners" (de Klerk, 2003: 19). 
Further examples of a tiered membership structure have been provided by SAlCA 
in its submission to SARS (Arendse, 2005:6), for example: 
Those with no academic qualifications but with the required minimum 
amount of experience could be admitted to levell, those who have 
successfully completed at least one year full-time university / technikon 
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level course in taxation and two years accounting could be admitted to 
level 2 and level 3 would require the successful completion of at least two 
years' fuII-time university course in taxation, one year of law and four 
years of accounting and I or extensive practical experience. 
The scope of work provided by members wiII also have to vary depending on the 
tier of membership. This again would need to be investigated by SARS. SAICA 
proposes that "the scope of work permitted within each tier of membership must be 
clearly established, and properly publicised, taking into account the level of skiII 
required for the work aIIowed" (Arendse, 2005:6). The fact that all Chartered 
Accountants may not have kept up to date with tax practice or may not have the 
necessary experience, is controIIed by SAICA's code of professional conduct. 
"SAICA members are required to ensure that they only perform work for which 
they consider that they are suitably qualified and, as members in the highest tier, 
they would therefore be permitted to do any tax work, but subject to their 
professional Code of Conduct" (Arendse, 2005:7). Finally, SAICA proposes that 
"the membership certificate or similar document should clearly reflect the level of 
membership and the public must be made aware of the different levels and scope of 
work aIIowed" (Arendse, 2005:7). 
Another form of membership referred to in the discussion document is an 
"associate member", the meaning of which is not clear. This needs to be clarified 
by SARS, because currently it is interpreted as relating to members who form part 
of existing, recognized professional bodies, such as SAICA and that these members 
would be granted "associate membership". The discussion document, however, 
contains no further detail relating to these types of members. For example, would 
they pay lower fees, would all members forming part of a recognized professional 
body automatically be eligible to become members of the Association and which 
body would discipline the member? SAICA's proposal to SARS is that "all SAlCA 
members should be given automatic admission to the regulatory Board ... SAICA 
will then register these members with the regulatory Board as a bulk registration ... 
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SAICA members should continue to be regulated by SAICA, with the avenue open 
to the regulatory Board to report any unacceptable behavior to SAICA and ensure 
that appropriate action is taken timeously" (Arendse, 2005:6). 
The admission requirements are a critical aspect of the success of the organization 
and due to all the conflicting views mentioned above, an area that can be 
highlighted for further research. 
• No separate identification of categories of membership 
A problem identified is that all members will be grouped together on admission to 
the Association and have one professional identity. SAICA is of the opinion that 
"the academic standard and professional requirements of Chartered Accountants is 
higher that any other professional accountancy body in South Africa and it is 
essential that this accomplishment is not diminished in any way through the 
regulation process" (Arendse 2005:6). SAICA puts forward two solutions to this 
problem, the fust being that SAICA members should be recognised as 'accredited 
members', however no further elaboration on the definition of this category of 
membership is given. The second solution is that it "may be necessary to have 
different tiers of membership of the regulatory Board, with admission to each tier 
dependent upon the academic qualification, experience and professional level of the 
member. If this approach is followed, SAICA members must be admitted to the 
highest tier of membership, given their qualifications and compulsory practical 
training and requirements for CPD" (Arendse, 2005:6). The second alternative, 
however, requires further investigation, as the admission requirements for each tier 
need to be clearly determined and applied. The scope of work provided by 
members will also have to vary depending on the tier of membership. Additionally, 
as stated above, SAICA proposed that "the membership certificate or similar 
document should clearly reflect the level of membership and the public must be 
made aware of the different levels and scope of work allowed" (Arendse, 2005:7). 
The approach to membership as proposed by SAICA is unique to South Africa and 
needs to be carefully considered and investigated by SARS. Other professional 
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bodies may not agree with the fact that SAICA members would automatically be 
granted the highest tier of membership. This approach does, however, have its 
advantages as the public will be made aware the status of the member they are 
dealing with, which level the practitioner occupies in the Association and the 
qualifications or experience the practitioner has. It could also serve to limit the cost 
to members who belong to existing recognized professional bodies. The example 
provided in this research relates to Chartered Accountants only, but legal or other 
accounting bodies may also believe that they are entitled to the top tier of 
membership and automatic admission. This is an area in which SARS will have to 
exercise care to make the right decision, taking into account all of the proposals 
above, that will be to the benefit of all parties involved. 
• Costs 
Many of the problems raised by various commentators and the writer, relating to 
the SARS proposal, are such that they would make the cost of membership very 
high. This would have to be passed on to the taxpaying public in the form of fees. 
This may have the effect that prohibitive costs would dissuade taxpayers from 
consulting practitioners and the objectives of the Association will be frustrated. 
• Funding the Association 
A fmal omission in the proposal of SARS relates to funding. The intention of 
SARS is that the Association will become self-funding after one year of operation, 
but no method is suggested as to how the Association will achieve this. No 
proposed fee structure or method of calculating fees is set out in the proposal. It is 
therefore difficult to establish what costs will be borne by the tax practitioners on 
the formation of the Association. This needs to be clarified to ensure that costs are 
not excessively high and are determined in a transparent method. 
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Conclusion 
The concerns and problem areas identified in the above paragraphs need to be 
investigated by SARS before finalization of the Association. The discussion also 
highlights areas where further research could be conducted. In addition to these areas of 
concern, certain advantages of the EAAB and AT AB model were identified in the course 
of their review in chapters 4 and 5, respectively, and in the comparison with the 
conceptual regulatory framework in this chapter. These advantages could be used as a 
basis for SARS to realign its proposal in order to achieve the desired effect ofregulation, 
being that of public protection. SAICA, the CPA and other institutions submitted 
recommendations to SARS as to how the proposal could be improved to ensure that the 
ultimate objective was achieved, as well as ways in which changes could be made to 
ensure that the regulation was not to the detriment of tax professionals currently 
practising in South Africa. 
The writer of this research is of the opinion that the SARS proposal is too prescriptive 
and, at the same time, too broad. A simplified regulation procedure such as the AT AB 
model would appear to be preferable. The SARS proposal is a hybrid of the other 
regulation models. What the fmal model should be, depends on the intention of the 
legislature. 
In the case of the estate agents, it was necessary to create a new professional 
qualification, a professional monopoly for registered estate agents and a professional 
body to regulate and promote all aspects of the property market. This previously 
unregulated market sector, in which any person could act as an agent selling property and 
acting for sellers and purchasers of fixed property, created the opportunity for abuse and 
the potential for instability in an important sector of the economy. The solution to this 
problem required an Act of Parliament which codified all regulations for the creation of 
the profession of an estate agent - membership, admission requirements, qualifications, 
disciplinary rules, offences, penalties, an ethical code, training and continuous 
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professional development, promotion of the industry and creating public awareness, fees 
and an infrastructure to administer this effectively and efficiently. 
This is very similar to the establishment of the Chartered Accounting profession, which 
has its constituting legislation, a Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board, the South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants designed to serve the interests of its members 
and two tiers of membership - those in public practice and those who may only use the 
designation of "Chartered Accountant SA". 
The model of the Australian Tax Agents Board is far simpler. It recognizes that tax 
practitioners are usually members of an already regulated profession, subject to its own 
admission requirements and disciplinary rules. Regulation of tax agents is effected 
through the taxation Act, which includes all the necessary regulations. The Board is a 
very simple structure designed only to deal with complaints, membership qualifications 
and discipline. Its low cost, simplicity and practicality make it an appropriate model for 
the South African situation. 
The principal of regulation should be embraced by tax advisors, as this will protect their 
professional integrity and help to manage the relationship between advisors, SARS and 
the National Treasury. An appropriately structured Association of Tax Practitioners 
should also contribute towards improving tax compliance and lowering the economic cost 
of administering the whole tax system by reducing services, tax queries and legal disputes 
arising from poor advice. Such an Association would therefore be of benefit to all 
stakeholders. 
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